

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/29/2002

On 04/24/2002, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), contacted [redacted]. This contact was initiated to collect information regarding reports that swabbing, which resulted in presumptive positive results, had been conducted outside the laboratory suites at United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland. After the interviewing agents identified themselves and advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] is further described as [redacted] born [redacted] social security number [redacted] [redacted] home telephone [redacted] work telephone [redacted] is the [redacted] USAMRIID, Ft Detrick, Maryland.

On 04/08/02, [redacted] telephoned from the B3 suite and reported a suspected spill in the lab. [redacted] advised [redacted] to report it through the safety channels, which is the proper method for handling the incident. [redacted] immediately notified [redacted]

At [redacted] instruction, on 04/9-11/02, [redacted] conducted a sampling survey inside B3 to determine what, if any, contamination occurred from the spill. The survey identified some spots with "presumptive positive" results for B.A. [redacted] was concerned that [redacted] found contamination on the latch of the pass-thru box. [redacted] was concerned because that area is a point of entry and exit for materials into the B3 suite.

On 04/10/02 or 04/11/02, [redacted] learned that a nasal swab of [redacted] was positive for anthrax spores.

On 04/15/02, [redacted] advised [redacted] that DR. BRUCE IVINS, a research microbiologist, had approached [redacted] about conducting a sampling survey on the pass-thru box on the cold-side, meaning outside the B3 laboratory. (If someone we

b7E

Investigation on 04/24/2002 at Ft Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-302-179

Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

279A-NY-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/25/2002, Page 2

b6  
b7c

bringing something into B3, they would place the item into the pass-thru box door located in the hallway. They would then enter B3 and open the pass-thru box from inside the lab and retrieve the materials. While in the pass-thru box, the materials are bathed in ultraviolet rays to decontaminate the outside of the packaging.)

[REDACTED] strongly advised IVINS against conducting any sampling. [REDACTED] did not think that IVINS would do any sampling.

On 04/16/02, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In following up, IVINS [REDACTED] found "presumptive positives" for B.A. outside of [REDACTED] suite. [REDACTED] One appeared to be a "pure colony" of about 200 spores, which is not considered a significant amount. The other samples were one to two colonies and appeared "dirty" with other organisms.

On 04/17/02 [REDACTED] did further tests which indicated that it was not the Stearns Strain of B.A.

On 04/17/02, [REDACTED] conducted additional sampling of the cold-side of the pass-thru box and the cold-side women's changing room. All were negative and the areas were decontaminated with bleach.

On 04/18/02, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the decision to pass the samples obtained by IVINS to the [REDACTED]

On 04/18/02, over thirty additional samples were conducted outside the B3 lab in the hallway area. All samples were negative. As a precaution, the hallway was decontaminated with bleach.

On 04/19/02, the decision was made to bring an objective survey team to conduct extensive sampling of the lab and surrounding area to determine the extent, if any, of contamination. A team was brought in from the Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine (CHPPM), Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Edgewood, Maryland.

On 04/19/02, CHPPM conducted a sampling survey of the off-base facility that did laundry for USAMRIID, including towels used in the B3 change rooms. All samples were negative.

279A-NY-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of

[Redacted]

, On 04/25/2002

, Page 3

b6  
b7c

On 04/21/02, CHPPM conducted extensive sampling in the original areas where IVINS did his sampling. They did the pass-thru box area, IVINS office (Rm [Redacted]), and the cold-side men's changing rooms. Of the 109 samples of these areas, they found one spore on top of the locker in the men's changing room and one spore in IVINS's office (Rm [Redacted]) on the bookshelf by the door. Both were areas where IVINS' had also found one to two spore colonies.

On 04/23-24/02, the men's cold-side changing room and IVINS' office (Rm [Redacted]) were decontaminated with bleach.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/23/2002

On August 23, 2002, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted] by Special Agent [redacted] FBI, and Postal Inspector [redacted] United States Postal Inspection Service. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] is located in building [redacted] Also in building [redacted] is a [redacted] which has multiple uses. Because the [redacted] they have an opportunity for collaboration with people from other divisions.

[redacted] has been using the Ames strain of anthrax since 1991, as well as other strains of anthrax in various aerosol studies. A batch of spores was created at Dugway Proving Ground for use in aerosol studies at USAMRIID. These spores are kept as a wet spore preparation in the Bacteriology Division. BRUCE IVINS in Bacteriology is responsible for making the spore dilutions necessary for the aerosol experiments.

The technicians in the aerosol lab are assigned on a rotation due to the large number of studies conducted in the lab. A record is maintained of every individual spray in each aerosol experiment conducted. There are usually two people executing each spray together, with approximately 5 to 6 working in the lab on a given study. Each aerosol study is conducted for several days, and the time frame is dependent on the number of animals being used in the study.

[redacted] did not know much about [redacted] only that [redacted] worked with [redacted] [redacted] from approximately [redacted] advised that the [redacted] would have been done in Room [redacted] in Building [redacted] and that [redacted] did not recall [redacted] being on [redacted] of [redacted]

b7E

Investigation on 08/23/2002 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 SUE 302-193 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]



279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 08/23/2002, Page 2 b6 b7C

very often. [ ] interacted with [ ] regarding the [ ] but only had a peripheral interaction with [ ] chatted a lot with [ ] described [ ] as [ ] therefore [ ] would mostly deal with [ ]

[ ] advised that the *B. anthracis* used in aerosol studies was plated out specifically for the study, brought to the aerosol lab from Bacteriology, used in the study, and autoclaved. No spores were actually maintained in Aerobiology.

The aerosol equipment used consisted of small aerosol chambers and nebulizers kept inside a hood with negative pressure. All equipment was autoclaved after use, and [ ] advised that it would have been difficult to remove equipment from the lab. No lyophilizers were necessary in the aerosol studies, as they did not use dry spores.

[ ] advised that [ ] was a [ ] [ ] write a report of their work, and if they are not productive, they will not [ ]

[ ] did not think [ ] had access to *Bacillus anthracis* and [ ] did not recall ever seeing [ ] during anthrax aerosol studies. [ ] did not recall ever hearing anything about [ ] hanging around during anthrax sprays. [ ] advised that to [ ] knowledge, [ ] mostly worked with [ ] [ ] did not appear to be interested in anthrax work. [ ] would have had to be vaccinated against anthrax if [ ] worked in Building [ ]

279A-WF-222936 SUB [REDACTED] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/23/2002, Page 3

[REDACTED] once saw [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] at a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] could not recall the year [REDACTED] but  
advised that several people from the department were present  
including: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] together at any time  
other than [REDACTED] worked on [REDACTED] and  
therefore would have had access to [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] did not have much interaction with [REDACTED]

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/09/2002

On September 4, 2002, [redacted]  
[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]  
place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick,  
Maryland, telephone [redacted] by Special Agent [redacted]  
[redacted] FBI, and Postal Inspector [redacted] After being  
advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information.

b6  
b7C

In Building [redacted] suites [redacted] are both cold.  
Building [redacted] suite [redacted] is primarily a cold suite, however [redacted]  
[redacted] are all hot areas. Building [redacted] suite number  
[redacted] and above are hot areas. [redacted] characterized these areas  
as [redacted] advised that anthrax  
research was mostly done in Building [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] worked in: suite [redacted]  
[redacted]

Most freezers in Building [redacted] were left unlocked until  
1995, including the -70 degree freezers in Aerobiology that had  
*Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) stored in them. [redacted]  
[redacted] worked in suite [redacted] which was [redacted]  
[redacted] All B.a. preparation work was done in suite [redacted]  
[redacted] was responsible for getting the freezers locked in  
1995.

[redacted] recalled [redacted] working in  
Building [redacted] within the [redacted] time frame. [redacted]  
advised that [redacted] worked mainly on [redacted] and that  
[redacted] performed some [redacted] in suite [redacted]  
[redacted] recalled [redacted] on  
[redacted] in suite [redacted] which was a [redacted]

[redacted] characterized [redacted] relationship with [redacted]  
as [redacted] [redacted] became closely

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 09/04/2002 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-2F-222936 [redacted] 302-2530 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

279A-2F-222936-SUB [REDACTED] 302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/04/2002, Page 2

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] thought it seemed like [REDACTED] knew the [REDACTED] schedule better than [REDACTED] did.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] advised that this was not unusual as [REDACTED] remembered that shortly after [REDACTED] arrived at USAMRIID, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was unsure of [REDACTED] mission at USAMRIID.  
[REDACTED] at and advised that [REDACTED] thought it strange that [REDACTED] was involved with [REDACTED] on that subject at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] often observed [REDACTED] back in the [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] would observe studies that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] do this during [REDACTED]

The door was kept locked [REDACTED] however [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also saw [REDACTED] walk through the lab during [REDACTED] without being dressed in protective clothing. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described some of the equipment used in the [REDACTED] in that it was made at USAMRIID. Some of the [REDACTED] used in the studies were engineered and tested at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] described suites [REDACTED] on the hot side of the building, which were built in the 1950s, as fascinating. Although they had the same basic set up as the other hot suites they were more awe inspiring. [REDACTED] was present in suite [REDACTED] during anthrax sprays. [REDACTED] advised that anthrax sprays are

b6  
b7C

279A-2F-222936-SUB [REDACTED] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/04/2002, Page 3

very time consuming as they take place over three consecutive days. [REDACTED] thought that the spray, along with the surroundings of suite [REDACTED] would have been fascinating to [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

Upon exiting the [REDACTED] would have been able to see the preparation for an anthrax spray in [REDACTED] and would notice the activity as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would often observe anthrax sprays and no one would bother [REDACTED] as it was a very hectic atmosphere during the experiment. Only a mask and scrubs had to be worn to be in the lab during the spray, and it would be easy to gain access to the lab as the combination lock would be disabled in order to expedite the set up procedure. [REDACTED] asked questions about the dosage and media being used in the sprays.

BRUCE IVINS [REDACTED] would culture the B.a. used in the aerosol experiments in suite [REDACTED] IVINS would need to leave [REDACTED] in order to pick up the samples from Bacteriology, and at that time the lab was left unsecured. Further, the door between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was left unlocked, and there was a refrigerator in [REDACTED] that did not lock.

IVINS prepared the B.a. for the nebulizer in Building [REDACTED]. He would then bring the B.a. to Building [REDACTED] suite [REDACTED] and transfer the samples to 50 milliliter (ml) conical tubes. The samples were then sent straight to the hood line for the aerosol challenge. [REDACTED] recalled that IVINS labeled everything and would tape the tops of the tubes for easy removal.

b6  
b7C  
b7F

After the sprays, the samples would go back to IVINS in 15ml conical tubes to be transferred to an agar plate and left in an incubator overnight in [REDACTED] This was done to quantify the amount of B.a. in the samples that had been used. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] would not have noticed a missing sample, but perhaps IVINS would have. Any remaining labeled samples would have been kept in the unlocked refrigerator in [REDACTED] Other remaining tubes and plates would have been in the unlocked incubator in [REDACTED] These tubes and plates would not have been strictly accounted for.

Once the tubes and plates in the incubator had been checked for colonies, they would have been placed in a garbage bag under one of the hoods to be autoclaved. [REDACTED] advised that they could have sat in the bag for weeks.

b6  
b7C

279A-2F-222936-SUB [REDACTED] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/04/2002, Page 4

There was one keycode for [REDACTED] but many people were in possession of it because they shared equipment that was kept in there. Once a person gains entry to the room, the lock can be disarmed so that if you exit it does not re-lock. The Fire Department used a 911 code to override the lock, and this code was well known. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] most likely knew of this code, but as [REDACTED] was cleared to go into the hot side, [REDACTED] could probably go anywhere [REDACTED] wanted.

b6  
b7C  
b7F

Suite [REDACTED] was converted into a Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) lab by [REDACTED] and therefore could not be accessed for a while nor could the equipment contained therein be used by anyone other than those assigned to [REDACTED]. However, if one could gain access to suite [REDACTED] you could enter suite [REDACTED] through there.

[REDACTED] estimated that in Building [REDACTED] there are approximately [REDACTED] hot suites on the [REDACTED] floor, at least [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not get the impression that [REDACTED] was overly interested in anthrax, although [REDACTED] was present at some strange times and would pop into the lab during aerosol experiments. [REDACTED] would have known where anthrax was kept at USAMRIID.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] never talked about using anthrax as a weapon. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] described [REDACTED] appearance as a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] wanted to work for [REDACTED]

279A-2F-222936-SUB [REDACTED] 302

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/04/2002, Page 5

when [REDACTED] was around, which placed [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised that security has gotten a lot tighter at USAMRIID since September 11, 2001, although the freezer in [REDACTED] is still generally not locked. This freezer contains animal sera from aerosol experiments.

[REDACTED] has not been on the hot side of [REDACTED] Although there are no [REDACTED] in place at USAMRIID, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] left [REDACTED] position in [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] would have known [REDACTED] as they both worked on anthrax sprays. [REDACTED] is now in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] once saw [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was surprised to see [REDACTED] there,  
[REDACTED]

Because of the nature of their job and the number of night and weekend animal deaths, veterinarians have access to every hot suite at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] were seen on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] speculated that it might have been in suite [REDACTED] because it was not a suite that was used much.

Some areas of Building [REDACTED] were intermittently closed from 1995 to late 1996 due to renovations. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not under the impression that [REDACTED] could dry B.a.. Although [REDACTED] did not think it would be difficult to work with anthrax, it would be more difficult to dry

279A-2F-222936-SUB [ ] 302

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ], On 09/04/2002, Page 6

b6  
b7c

it. [ ] did not think that USAMRIID had the personnel or technology to work with dry spores. [ ] has never worked with dried anthrax.

[ ] never expressed an interest in Aerobiology. [ ] asked [ ] about [ ] work, but the specifics were never clear. [ ] advised that [ ] is not the type to share much information either.

[ ] appeared to be a good scientist, although [ ] Both [ ] were arrogant.

In addition to [ ] worked with: [ ] along with many of the [ ] kept most of [ ] equipment in [ ] and shared an office with [ ] thought it was strange that [ ] would go to USAMRIID as an [ ]

[ ] left USAMRIID while [ ] was in the middle of a [ ]

[ ] has never seen [ ] back at USAMRIID since [ ] left, and [ ] has not been in any contact with [ ] had no recollection of [ ] discussing USAMA BIN LADEN or Al-Qaeda and had no knowledge of any associates [ ] might have in New Jersey. [ ] does not know [ ] whereabouts last fall.

[ ] who worked in [ ] and left in [ ] came into the lab during off hours. [ ] last saw [ ] on [ ] for a meeting. [ ] mostly worked with [ ] and still has some ongoing studies with [ ]



- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/10/2002

On October 8, 2002, [ ] was interviewed at [ ] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [ ] by Special Agent [ ] FBI, and Postal Inspector [ ] After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [ ] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[ ] was provided with a copy of the second floor plan for Building [ ] with three freezers drawn in the hallway outside of room [ ] The floor plan is contained in the 1A envelope with [ ] subsequent notations using red ink for pre-renovation and black ink for post-renovation respectively, as well as notations indicating the location of certain features of the first floor and basement in Building [ ]

b6  
b7C

[ ] advised that the three freezers are still in the same location indicated on the floor plan, however these are new freezers that hold the same contents as the previous ones. [ ] further advised that these freezers were obtained prior to the departure of [ ] from USAMRIID. The freezers are kept at -70° Celsius and are equipped with an alarm that sounds if the door is kept open long enough for the temperature to rise. After the alarm sounds and the door is closed, it is difficult to reopen the door. This is because of a strong vacuum seal that develops until the temperature returns to normal.

b6  
b7C

[ ] thought that the freezers may have had locks in place during the time that [ ] was employed at USAMRIID, however these locks may not have been used. The freezers may also have all had the same generic lock that everyone had the key for. There are new locks on these freezers that were installed approximately two to three weeks ago, however they are not very sturdy as they must be glued rather than bolted to the exterior of the freezer in order to preserve the freezer's structural integrity.

During the renovations of Building [ ] in the [ ] 1990s, [ ] During that time their freezers were kept on the [ ]

b6  
b7C

b7E

Investigation on 10/08/2002 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302-285 Date dictated N/Aby SA [ ]

279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ], On 10/08/2002, Page 2

Building [ ] The freezers were not locked and their doors were taped shut. These freezers had to be moved to a Biosafety Level (BL) 3 [ ] in order to open them to obtain any of the contents. [ ] estimated that they returned to their lab space in [ ] after the renovations were finished.

b6  
b7C

Prior to the renovations of Building [ ] many freezers were kept in the hallways of the building, but after the renovations were completed the volume of freezers in the hallways had to be reduced. [ ] estimated that [ ] may have had [ ] freezers and [ ] may have had [ ] freezers in the hallway prior to the renovations.

Through the window of a door labeled [ ] showed the agents [ ] freezers in the hallway, as well as a cold room on the left side of the hallway that [ ] later indicated as room [ ] on the floor plan. [ ] advised that the Virology Division has some laboratory space in the area behind the door labeled [ ] but [ ] was not sure exactly where since laboratory space assignments change frequently.

On the first floor is room [ ] which is a hot room used for aerosol study preparation as well as to house animals. Near room [ ] is a stairway that leads to the second floor and close to [ ] freezers in the hallway. [ ] advised that [ ] works with *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) [ ]

[ ] most likely has B.a. in [ ] freezers.

The first floor also had a cold room which was used by BRUCE IVINS and [ ] and would have had B.a. samples in it. Room [ ] is a hot room with a hood line in which the aerosolization studies would have been conducted.

[ ] estimated that there were approximately six freezers and one cold room in the basement of Building [ ] two of which are [ ] one of which may belong to the Virology Division. [ ] thinks that [ ] would be the only freezers in the basement that would contain B.a..

To obtain a sample of B.a. from the freezer, [ ] advised that [ ] however there is no policy in place governing that. [ ] has not cleaned out the contents of any of [ ] freezers since the departure of [ ] from USAMRIID. As part of routine decontamination, [ ] uses a bleach solution

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 10/08/2002 , Page 3

to wipe down external areas of [ ] freezers that people would most likely touch, including the alarm silence button and the handle on the door. [ ] does not wipe down the entire exterior of the freezers nor any of the interior.

During the renovation of Building [ ] keypads were installed to regulate access to the various labs and suites. Because some equipment is shared among lab groups, people need to gain access to labs that they don't normally work in.

[ ] has heard of a 911 override code for the keypads, however [ ] does not know if it actually works. If someone was in medical distress inside of a hot suite, there is a call box that can be used to contact security, however the protocol for such emergencies has been changed frequently. [ ] had never heard of a 911 distress code in case of an emergency inside of a hot suite. [ ] advised that USAMRIID has its own medical unit that responds for any kind of exposure incident.

The procedure for working outside of one's normal shift has changed recently. In the past, people were supposed to sign in with security when they came in to work after hours, and they could go ahead and work by themselves at night and on the weekends. Now they must sign in with security when they arrive after hours and they must work with a buddy. One can gain access to the building and their work space without signing in, but security will see the individual's activity on the keypads and will lock them in the building. The person must call security in order to exit the work area.

[ ] thought it was strange that [ ] never [ ] if wanted to obtain some B.a. at USAMRIID. They never made any small talk, but [ ] thought that [ ] may have kept [ ] ears open and found out that [ ] worked with B.a. [ ] does not remember seeing [ ] on the hot side, even when [ ] was coming and going frequently while trying to move things back after the renovation.

[ ] thought that it would have been easier for [ ] to obtain the Ames strain of B.a. from the aerosol study preparation area rather than from one of [ ] freezers, as [ ] keeps many different strains of B.a. in [ ] freezers. [ ] also thought it would have been easier to obtain it from the [ ] as there was a box in there containing B.a. spores and was labeled as such. [ ] also had B.a. in suite [ ] during the

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 10/08/2002, Page 4

b6  
b7C

renovation. [ ] advised that if an individual knew of people's work and assigned freezers, the facility would have been "like a candy store" in terms of obtaining B.a.

[ ] took the agents to the north loading dock in Building 1425 where there were many functioning freezers stored. All of the freezers had locks in place and each had a form with point of contact information. [ ] advised that [ ] freezers were probably not locked when they were stored on the loading dock during the renovation and that the forms had only been in use for a few months.

[ ] discussed a closed "anthrax building" that had been used during the offensive bioweapons program at USAMRIID. [ ] described it as the tallest building at Fort Detrick, and as being on the other side of the post from USAMRIID. The building was shut down because of contamination during the switch from the offensive to the defensive bioweapons program. At one time, [ ] gave tours of the building, although [ ] was not aware of any tours currently taking place. [ ] advised that the tours were started in order to promote a sense of openness with the community and that Fort Detrick Headquarters was probably responsible for starting up the program. [ ] had heard rumors about the building being leveled, or that it might be given to the National Cancer Institute (NCI).

In approximately [ ] went over to the closed anthrax building [ ] to see the facility. [ ] described fermentors that extended for the height of the building and looked like rocket ships. These fermentors were filled with B.a. during the time that the building was operational. There were also many hood lines that [ ] thought could still be functional.

[ ] advised that there should not be any Ames strain B.a. present in the building as it has been closed down since 1969. Any type of repair to the hood lines or anything else would be obvious. [ ] thought it would not have been difficult to use that building to prepare the anthrax letters.

[ ] does not think that an incubator, shaker, or lyophilizer would have been necessary to prepare the type of dry spores that were seen in the anthrax letters. [ ] did a [ ]

279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ], On 10/08/2002, Page 5

[ ]  
[ ] advised that with the Ames strain of *B.a.*, the vegetative matter breaks down very quickly if you let the spores sit in water. [ ] thinks that something was added to the spores in the anthrax letters to make them lighter. [ ] recalled a sample that [ ] received from Dugway Proving Grounds behaving in a similar manner to that which was described for the anthrax letters. [ ] opened the sample in the hood and [ ] described the spores coming out like a cloud. [ ] would like [ ] of the FBI to look at the spores [ ], as they are very clean.

[ ] agreed to take digital photographs of [ ] freezers and the area surrounding them in Building [ ] and to provide them to the agents on a CD.

279A-WF-222936-[redacted]-283  
279A-WF-222936-302-2564

b6  
b7C

1

[redacted] The following investigation was conducted by IRS [redacted]  
[redacted] at WFO on 10/28/2002:

A copy of a subpoena return from Walmart Pharmacy, 702  
SW 8th St, Bentonville, AR 72716 was reviewed.

Walmart had been requested to locate [redacted]  
[redacted] Included in the request were several names  
believed to be possible aliases of [redacted]

[redacted]

The copy of the subpoena return from Walmart is being  
maintained in the 1A section of the file.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/11/2002

On October 11, 2002, [redacted] was interviewed telephonically at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted] by Postal Inspector [redacted] United States Postal Inspection Service. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Postal Inspector and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] does not remember any conversations with [redacted] related to [redacted] [redacted] advised that [redacted] had only a few conversations with [redacted] but does not remember [redacted] asking [redacted]

[redacted] could not rule out the possibility that [redacted] may have asked [redacted] but [redacted] does not remember it.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] vaguely remembered [redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] did not recall whether [redacted] attended the [redacted] but advised that BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] [redacted] attended. [redacted] also mentioned that [redacted] [redacted] (phonetic spelling) would know whether [redacted] attended. [redacted] stated that [redacted] most likely did not attend the [redacted]

[redacted] advised that an international conference on anthrax was held in Annapolis, Maryland in June 2001. [redacted] said that an anthrax conference is held approximately every four years.

This information was provided to SA [redacted] FBI by Postal Inspector [redacted] for incorporation into [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 10/11/2002 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936 SUB [redacted] 302-290 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936 SUB  302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 10/11/2002, Page 2

FD-302 format.



- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/03/2002

On November 1, 2002, [ ] date of birth [ ]  
[ ] social security account number [ ]  
[ ] was interviewed at [ ] place of  
employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of  
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone  
[ ] by Special Agent [ ] FBI, and Postal  
Inspector [ ] United States Postal Inspection  
Service. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the  
purpose of the interview, [ ] provided the following information:

[ ] started working in [ ] with [ ]  
[ ] in [ ] and moved to the [ ]  
[ ] in [ ] While in [ ] worked on [ ]  
[ ] along with [ ] and [ ]

[ ] knew [ ] for approximately [ ]  
and had a few encounters with [ ] during [ ]  
[ ] would request [ ]  
in [ ] recalled that the [ ] involved [ ]  
[ ] and may have been [ ] studies. [ ] estimated that [ ]  
conducted [ ] although  
[ ] was unsure of the exact date. These studies were done over  
approximately a [ ] time frame.

[ ] advised that [ ] would sometimes be present  
during the [ ] however [ ] did not recall  
that [ ] was present during any *Bacillus anthracis* sprays.  
Both *B. anthracis* and pox sprays were done in room [ ] of Building  
[ ]

[ ] kept [ ] experimental animals on the hot side of  
[ ] and would bring them to room [ ] for the aerosol challenges  
[ ] Only four animals can be challenged at once, and the  
process takes approximately thirty five minutes from start to  
finish. If the technicians needed assistance, [ ] would obtain  
the next set of four animals from the holding area for them. At  
the conclusion of the spray, [ ] would either come to obtain  
the spray samples or the technicians would bring the samples to  
[ ]

Investigation on 11/01/2002 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 SUB 302-2660 302-315Date dictated N/Aby SA [ ]

279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ], On 11/01/2002, Page 2

[ ] does not recall whether any B.a. sprays took place immediately after [ ] sprays, however at least forty eight hours would have elapsed between sprays of two different agents due to decontamination measures.

[ ] had no recollection of [ ] being involved with B.a., and advised that [ ] only did B.a. sprays for [ ] and for BRUCE IVINS. IVINS prepares the B.a. samples for aerosol challenges and transfers them directly to the Aerobiology technicians in room [ ] of Building [ ]. [ ] advised that IVINS would not have brought B.a. samples in and left them unattended in room [ ].

b6  
b7C

[ ] advised that [ ] felt uncomfortable around [ ] due to some conversations that they had and perhaps because [ ] described [ ] as a [ ] and advised that [ ] spent some time in the [ ] and was familiar with the circumstances in [ ] had heard about [ ].

b6  
b7C

[ ] conversations with [ ] were mostly about how [ ] sprays were going. They did not engage in any personal conversation. [ ] never asked [ ] about B.a. sprays and [ ] did not seem to be interested in B.a. [ ] appeared to be focused on [ ] own research.

[ ] did not know where [ ] kept [ ] samples, although [ ] assumes that they were kept in [ ] lab which was located on the [ ] next to the [ ] lab and across from the [ ] lab. [ ] recalled [ ] co-workers to be [ ]. [ ] did not know who performed necropsies on [ ] experimental animals.

[ ] did not have any knowledge that [ ] knew where B.a. was stored. [ ] did not think that B.a. storage areas were common knowledge at USAMRIID. [ ] knew where B.a. was stored because [ ] worked with IVINS on B.a. sprays.

[ ] has not seen [ ] back at USAMRIID since [ ]. [ ] did not know of any [ ] that

279A-WF-222936 SUB [ ] 302

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ], On 11/01/2002, Page 3

[ ] may have had. [ ] advised that [ ] from [ ]  
was a close friend of [ ]

[ ]

[ ] advised that the door to the lab was usually locked during B.a. sprays. [ ] was responsible for putting keypad locks on all of the doors, but these locks began to malfunction during the 2000-2001 time frame.

The agent being used in the aerosol challenge was posted on the door of the lab. People wanting to gain access to the lab would stand at the door and wait to be waved in by the technicians. There were usually at least two technicians present during most aerosol studies, and therefore someone could open the door.

[ ] did not know [ ] to have any experience with B.a. techniques, and [ ] never heard that [ ] discussed or was knowledgeable about B.a. [ ] never heard of any missing lab equipment during [ ] tenure at USAMRIID.

[ ] had no knowledge of [ ] financial situation, work in other labs, associates in the New Jersey area, nor of any travel to New Jersey.

----- Working Copy -----

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- i -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/07/2002

In an effort to support the AMERITHRAX, Major Case 184, investigation, on Wednesday, February 27, 2002 and Thursday, February 28, 2002, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), conducted ten (10) polygraph examinations at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland.

The polygraphs were administered by FBI Special Agent (SA) [redacted] and SA [redacted] Newark Division, in the [redacted] at USAMRIID,

The following USAMRIID employee's voluntarily submitted to the polygraph examinations:

b6  
b7C

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2002;

11:00 A.M., Room RL2-Q-2, [redacted] [redacted]

9:00 A.M., Room RL204, [redacted]

11:00 A.M., Room RL2 02, [redacted]

11:00 A.M., Room RL204, [redacted]

2:00 P.M., Room RL202, [redacted]

2:00 P.M., Room RL204, [redacted]

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2002;

9:00 A.M., Room RL202, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

investigation on 02-28-2002 at Frederick, Maryland  
File it 279A-WF-222936, MAJOR CASE 184\_ Date dictated 03-07-2002\_  
^^

by SSA [REDACTED] FBIHQ, CTD, TOY AT USAMRIID\_

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions  
of the FBI. It is the property  
of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;  
it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(-U-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

279A-WF-222936, MAJOR CASE 184

Continuation of FD-302 of USAMRIID\_\_^02-28-2002 pag 2

9:00 A.M., Room RL204, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

11:00 A.M., Room RL202, DOCTOR BRUCE E. IVINS, PhD, Senior  
Principal Investigator, Bacteriology Division.

11:00 A.M., Room RL204, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] advised that the aforementioned  
individuals [REDACTED]

NOTE;

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (.Fort  
-Detr-i-c-k- [REDACTED]  
just USAMRIID), [REDACTED] intended participation in a polygraph  
\_examination. [REDACTED] stated that, [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

---- Working Copy ----

Page 3

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] further advised that [REDACTED] would voluntarily travel to the FBI,  
Washington Field Office (WFO) on an undetermined future date for a

----polygraph exandiitiLiorrr- - -: : :

[REDACTED] USAMRIID, also

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7CDate of transcription 01/14/2003

On January 10, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed telephonically at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

In reference to a September 18, 2001 trip that [redacted] BRUCE IVINS [redacted] to COVANCE, a facility located in Denver, Pennsylvania, [redacted] employed by the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), [redacted] advised as follows.

COVANCE did rabbit vaccine studies for USAMRIID with recombinant *Bacillus anthracis* vaccines. Denver, Pennsylvania is a small town in the middle of nowhere outside of Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

In order to use a government vehicle, the motor pool at USAMRIID would have required the driver to fill out a form and would have made a copy of the driver's license. [redacted] advised that [redacted] IVINS was an awful driver. IVINS may have a copy of the required form, and the motor pool should have a copy as well.

COVANCE is approximately a two hour drive from USAMRIID, and the group rode up and back together and remained together all day long. No one from the group broke off and went elsewhere. The trip would have taken the entire day consisting of the drive, dropping off the vaccine at COVANCE, and having lunch at a restaurant that [redacted] IVINS, [redacted] liked up in that area.

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7EInvestigation on 01/10/2003 at Washington, DC (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936 302-2909 440 702 302-279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-20-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/mjs

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of transcription 01/17/2003

On January 15, 2003, [redacted]  
[redacted] Fort Detrick, Maryland,  
telephone [redacted] provided the attached motor pool records to  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

The vehicle dispatch records indicate that BRUCE IVINS  
used a government vehicle on September 18, 2001 to travel round  
trip to Denver, Pennsylvania. Any passengers were not listed on  
the record.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] could also search for the vehicle  
request form submitted in connection with that vehicle dispatch.

b6  
b7C  
b7E

279A-WF-222936-302-2979

Investigation on 01/15/2003 at Fort Detrick, Marylandb6  
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936 - 5007Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]



FORT DETRICK

TMP NUMBER: G12-11496      VEHICLE DISPATCH RECORD      DATE: 09/18/01

TEMP USER: RIID      ASSIGNED TO: DISPATCH OFFICE  
PHONE:        YR-TYPE OF VEHICLE: 99-PLYMOUTH BREEZE  
OPER NAME/GRADE: IVINS, BRUCE      GSA NUMBER: G12-11496  
DISPATCH TIME: 07:42      OFF CODE: TMPD  
DISPATCH DATE: 09/18/01      SUBPOOL CODE: 2  
DATE TO RETURN: 09/18/01      TYPE OF DISPATCH: GEN DISPATCH  
CARD NO:

ODOMETER

BILLING INFO

BEGINNING MILEAGE: 41904	MILEAGE COST: 0.115 MONTHLY COST: 175.00	DESTINATION: DENVER, PA
ENDING MILEAGE: <u>          </u>	ACCESSORY CODE:	FUEL
OFF POST MILES: <u>          </u>	DAILY COST: 5.83	EXTENDED DISP: N
		MULTIPLE DRIVERS: Y
		DISPATCHER: DMA

PLEASE LIST ADDITIONAL OPERATORS:

Steve Vinos

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

DID YOU PERFORM OPERATOR MAINTENANCE?      YES      NO

3.

FORT DETRICK

TMP NUMBER: G12-11496      VEHICLE RETURN RECORD      DATE: 09/18/01  
TIME: 15:42:00

TEMP USER: RIID      ASSIGNED TO: DISPATCH OFFICE  
PHONE:       YR-TYPE OF VEHICLE: 99-PLYMOUTH BREE  
OPER NAME/GRADE: IVINS, BRUCE      GSA NUMBER: G12-11496  
DISPATCH TIME: 07:42      OFF CODE: RIID  
DISPATCH DATE: 09/18/01      SUBPOOL CODE: 2  
DATE TO RETURN: 09/18/01      TYPE OF DISPATCH: GEN DISPATCH  
CARD NO:

ODOMETER	BILLING INFO	CLOSED OUT BY: RR
BEGINNING MILEAGE: 41904	RETURN DATE: 09/18/01	NOTES:
ENDING MILEAGE: 42133	RETURN TIME: 15:42:00	DESTINATION:
OFF POST MILES: 227	VEHICLE USED:	DENVER, PA
MILES CHARGED: 229	1 Days 0 Hrs 0 Min	NOTES:
	DAILY RATE: \$ 5.83	
	DAILY COSTS: \$ 5.84	
MILEAGE RATE: \$0.115	ADMIN COSTS: \$ 4.50	FUEL: 0
MILEAGE COSTS:\$ 26.34	TOTAL CHARGES: \$ 36.67	OIL: 0
	( \$ 5.84 + \$ 4.50	DISPATCHER: DMA
	+ \$ 26.34)	

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/22/2003

[redacted] United States  
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases  
("USAMRIID"), social security account number: [redacted], date of  
birth: [redacted] office telephone: [redacted] was  
interviewed by [redacted] United States Postal Inspector,  
United States Postal Inspection Service, Washington Division, and  
[redacted] Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington Field Office. After Inspector [redacted] and Special Agent  
[redacted] showed [redacted] their official identification and explained to  
[redacted] the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following:

b6  
b7C

Although [redacted] is affiliated with the [redacted]  
at USAMRIID, [redacted] is formally assigned to the [redacted]  
[redacted] began working at USAMRIID  
in [redacted] and worked in the [redacted]  
Department. [redacted] spent [redacted]  
[redacted] in the different divisions. [redacted]  
[redacted]  
Approximately [redacted]  
during the [redacted] switched [redacted] research from [redacted]  
to [redacted] has only used Room [redacted] Building [redacted] as  
[redacted] since [redacted] began working at USAMRIID in [redacted]

While assigned to the [redacted]  
collaborated with [redacted]  
[redacted] did  
not speak to [redacted] beyond merely exchanging greetings.  
[redacted] was only around [redacted] during group meetings, lectures and  
seminars. [redacted] vaguely remembers attending group meetings where  
[redacted]  
could not recall specifics about the content of [redacted] research.  
The group meetings were held in the [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] cannot remember when [redacted] left USAMRIID.  
Nothing stands out in [redacted] mind regarding [redacted]  
thought [redacted] behavior was  
ordinary and did not attract [redacted] attention. [redacted] did not

Investigation on 01/15/2003 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-279A-BA-C101392-752

Date dictated N/A

by [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

279A-WF-222936; 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/15/2003 , Page 2

[REDACTED] socialize with [REDACTED] and did not know [REDACTED] immediate co-workers, friends or associates. [REDACTED] did not discuss anthrax with [REDACTED] and is not familiar with [REDACTED] research projects. [REDACTED] heard rumors about [REDACTED] after the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] does not know if [REDACTED] has friends or associates in the New Jersey area where the anthrax mailings occurred. Likewise, [REDACTED] did not hear [REDACTED] ever mention Usama Bin Laden or discuss terrorism. [REDACTED] is neither familiar with [REDACTED] knowledge of weaponizing anthrax nor familiar with [REDACTED] financial status.

[REDACTED] shared an office with other researchers in the [REDACTED] located in Building [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED] [REDACTED] office was located [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not know what lab [REDACTED] used [REDACTED] [REDACTED] lab is located in Building [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED] which is used for research into [REDACTED] which is a potential biological threat. The aim of the research is to understand these pathogens so the researchers can create vaccines to develop immunities to these pathogens. The research involves [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] have access to the Ames strain of anthrax for their research. The Ames strain of anthrax is used in research occurring only in the hot labs. [REDACTED] believes [REDACTED] obtained the Ames strain of anthrax in the hot labs from Bruce Ivins. Prior to removing the Ames strain of anthrax from the hot labs, they would irradiate it to ensure the safe removal of the antigens from the hot labs to the cold lab [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/13/2003

On January 7, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] telephone [redacted] After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] does not have a personal planner or daily calendar from 2001. [redacted] does not keep any of [redacted] credit card statements. [redacted] left [redacted] laboratory notebooks from [redacted] time at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [redacted] has a folder with [redacted] at [redacted] that contains some information on [redacted]

While [redacted] was employed at USAMRIID, [redacted] worked on two computers there, both of which are located in [redacted] One is currently being used by [redacted] and the other is being used by [redacted]

The USAMRIID computer system has an "L drive" on which all employees have a folder to store their data if their hard drive is full. [redacted] usually saved [redacted] work to the hard drive on [redacted] computer or to a disk. When [redacted] left employment at USAMRIID, [redacted] copied [redacted] data onto zip disks and has them with [redacted] The material is mostly general lab protocols. [redacted] did not make any entries in [redacted] computer regarding [redacted] daily activities, and advised that most experimental data would have been handwritten. [redacted] did not use any laboratory equipment that gave any dated printouts.

To the best of [redacted] recollection, [redacted] was working at USAMRIID on [redacted]

[redacted] recalled going to the [redacted] one night during the week of [redacted] with [redacted]

Investigation on 01/07/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 302 279A-BA-C101 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

WF-222936-302 3024

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 302, 279A-BA-C101

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 01/07/2003 , Page 2

[ ] During the fall months, [ ]

[ ]

[ ] recalled that on the evening of [ ] [ ] was at a [ ] Other individuals present at the [ ] include: BRUCE IVINS, [ ]

[ ] also thought that it was likely that [ ] and [ ] were present as well. [ ] recently moved to [ ]

[ ] never handled any of the four anthrax letters processed at USAMRIID, and [ ] assumes that they were handled only in Room [ ] of Suite [ ] does not know if the letters went through the passbox into the suite.

b6  
b7C

The same passbox was used by everyone in Suite [ ] and Suite [ ]. Gloves were not used when handling the passbox, as it was in a "no glove" area in the office near a telephone and a computer. When [ ] used the passbox, [ ] touched the latches, the door, the light switch, and the shelves. Others would have touched these same surfaces as well.

Building [ ] had only one pass box for the entire building. The [ ] passbox did not have a light switch, as the light was automatic.

[ ] advised that over the years [ ] probably touched everything in Suite [ ] as well as areas of Building [ ] without gloves. When [ ] first started at USAMRIID, [ ] did not have any lab space of [ ] own so [ ] shared all of [ ] equipment including [ ] centrifuge and shaker.

[ ] does not know where [ ] procured the plexiglass glovebox in Suite [ ] in which the letters were handled. [ ] knew that [ ] had not used that glovebox prior to its being used for the letters, as all of the gloveboxes [ ] had ever used were made of steel and glass.

There was a rumor that [ ] opened one of the letters in a [ ] lab in the clinical lab hallway prior to the letter being irradiated. [ ] referred to this incident in a [ ] interview with the FBI and advised that [ ]

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 302, 279A-BA-C101

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 01/07/2003, Page 3

b6  
b7C

has been in this laboratory once. [ ] recalled that [ ]  
IVINS were called by [ ] on a Sunday night to come into

[ ] This  
took place while [ ] was still working at USAMRIID.  
[ ] may have also been in this lab once, as [ ] did some  
work in that hallway.

Bacteriology and Diagnostic Services Division (DSD) do  
not get along with each other. [ ] provided training to the  
Bacteriology Division in how to handle DSD samples but Bacteriology  
only handled one sample for DSD. The sample had some contamination  
and they never received any other samples from DSD.

[ ] currently works in [ ] but [ ] previously  
worked in [ ] sometimes claims to have done  
things that [ ] hasn't and this has also led to some problems  
between the two divisions.

[ ] advised that [ ] did not use pre-stamped  
envelopes while at USAMRIID and did not see anyone else in  
possession of them. [ ] saw a picture of one of the anthrax  
letters at the FBI science review session and did not think that  
the paper was remarkable in any way.

[ ] once saw [ ] at a Xerox machine  
near the back door of Building [ ] directly across from where the  
security guards sit. [ ] does not know if the same machine is  
still in that location. [ ] does not recall seeing [ ] at  
the [ ]

[ ] never handled any of the four anthrax letters  
from the Fall 2001 mailings.

[ ] was advised that [ ] will need to  
be interviewed by the FBI. [ ] agreed to meet the agents at a  
later date to do a walk through of USAMRIID so that [ ] could point  
out to them exactly where [ ] worked. [ ] agreed to meet with  
SA [ ] in order to have the scent dogs check [ ] again.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/16/2003

On January 13, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] was [redacted] prior to the receipt of the anthrax letters by USAMRIID. [redacted] worked in [redacted] for approximately [redacted]

[redacted] advised that the anthrax letters were worked on in the following locations: Building [redacted] Suite [redacted] in the [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] The Daschle letter was handled in [redacted] Suite [redacted] and Suite [redacted] the Leahy letter was handled in Suite [redacted] the Post letter may have been handled in [redacted] and [redacted] did not know where the Brokaw letter had been handled.

The only letter [redacted] the Daschle letter. It was received at USAMRIID on the evening of October 15, 2001 and opened in Room [redacted] a biological safety level (BL) 2 facility. As soon as the powder behaved like cigarette smoke, it was determined that the Daschle letter was "too much" for a BL2 lab. It was locked in the refrigerator in [redacted] that night and moved to Suite [redacted] a [redacted] area, the next evening. A chain of custody on notebook paper was set up by [redacted] and the letter was signed out from [redacted]

After the Daschle letter was moved to [redacted] BRUCE IVINS made a dilution of the powder contained in it. IVINS took some powder out of the envelope with a scalpel and placed it in a glass cryovial. IVINS set up culture plates [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7EInvestigation on 01/13/2003 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 302-3051 523 B02-279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]b6  
b7C



279A-WF-222936-[ ] 302, 279A-BA-C10139

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 01/13/2003 . Page 2

[ ]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[ ] advised that the scalpel that IVINS used was probably a disposable one and that the culture plates were most likely tryptic soy agar. This media was made at USAMRIID, and the plates were stored in a cold room in [ ]. Each research group has their own supply of culture plates, and [ ] IVINS probably used their own plates rather than those from another research group.

The *Bacillus anthracis* grew on the culture plates overnight and [ ] IVINS counted the plates the next morning. Some of the plates had B.a. colonies that were too numerous to count. [ ] thinks that the dilution may have been  $1 \times 10^{1.5}$ . [ ]

b6  
b7C

After the Daschle letter was opened in [ ] approximately sixteen people who had been in and out of the room were tested for exposure to anthrax and placed on antibiotics. [ ] the following individuals as being in [ ] at that time: [ ]

[ ] worked [ ] on a regular basis. [ ] did not borrow lab coats, scrubs, respirators, or any other equipment from others. [ ] If [ ] pulls out more gloves than [ ] needs, [ ] places the extra gloves back in the box. [ ] shared the same type gloves with [ ]

b6  
b7C

[ ] described the normal sequence of events when [ ] enters the lab. In the cold side change room [ ] opens [ ] locker, gets out of [ ] street clothes, puts on scrubs, [ ]

[ ] in the hot side change room [ ] takes off [ ] All of these activities are done without [ ]

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 02, 279A-BA-C10139

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 01/13/2003 , Page 3

b6  
b7C

wearing gloves, and whether [ ] puts on gloves once [ ] entered the lab depends on what [ ] be doing that day. [ ] touches glassware, hood controls, and other such equipment without gloves. Before opening anything containing *B.a.* spores [ ] would put on gloves and a respirator. [ ] uses a bleach solution to clean the hood, all equipment that [ ] used that day, and the counter top. [ ] would not necessarily clean every area that [ ] touched with [ ] bare hands.

[ ] was not present in [ ] when [ ] IVINS opened the Daschle letter to obtain a *B.a.* sample [ ]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[ ] advised that the organism being used in a challenge is usually "plated" two days beforehand [ ]

[ ] advised that if this were the case, it would have been documented in [ ] lab notebooks.

The Daschle letter was contained within several ziplocs and positioned so that both the front and the back could be seen for photography purposes. [ ]

[ ]

[ ]

b6  
b7C

thereby made some of the FBI personnel unhappy, including SA [ ] SA [ ] and SA [ ] felt that this was [ ]

[ ]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

279A-WF-222936-[redacted] B02, 279A-BA-C10139

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

. On 01/13/2003 . Page 4

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

There is "bad blood" between DSD and Bacteriology.

[redacted] asked [redacted]  
[redacted] doesn't know what IVINS  
swabbed or when he conducted his swabbing, [redacted]  
[redacted] just prior to an April 19, 2002 town  
hall meeting at USAMRIID.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] learned that IVINS had taken fifty swabs of the  
office [redacted] does not know if  
he swabbed the [redacted] passbox. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] also thought that a slide containing B.a. that was  
removed from [redacted] had been mishandled. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-[redacted] 302, 279A-BA-C10139

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 01/13/2003 , Page 5

[redacted] advised that the letters would have had to be irradiated before returning them to the FBI. All work that was done with the letters should be documented in the DSD records. The case file is probably locked up with the Good Laboratory Practice (GLP) group in Building 1412. IVINS has a record of any work that he did with the evidence. IVINS [redacted] did side projects with the evidence.

[redacted] described [redacted] as very smart but not very organized [redacted]

[redacted] thinks that the contamination that IVINS found was from the letters and was because most people had mishandled them. The letters were not taken anywhere for presentation purposes. [redacted] had no knowledge of any of the letters being opened in the area [redacted] and again advised that [redacted]

[redacted] can not think of anyone that [redacted] thinks may be responsible for the mailings. [redacted] did not know [redacted] but remembers seeing [redacted] in the hallway. [redacted] never spoke with [redacted] advised that [redacted] knew [redacted] well.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] walked the agents around some areas of Building [redacted] took them to [redacted] which serves as an in processing center for items received. DSD started a computerized tracking system for these items in November 2001. There are approximately thirteen people that have full access to the room, and with the exception of those individuals, everyone entering must sign in. [redacted] would have the old sign in logs from [redacted]

b6  
b7C

[redacted] has locked drawers with some case files in them. Access is restricted to those who have full access to the room. The refrigerators and freezers in [redacted] are locked as

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 302, 279A-BA-C10139

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 01/13/2003 , Page 6

well. These locks were not in place during the time that the letters were being handled at USAMRIID. New keypads were installed around September or October 2002. A list of the following names and extensions was posted on the -20°C critical reagent freezer in

[ ]

b6  
b7C

Suite [ ] is kept locked. [ ] are both airlocks. [ ] are all cold suites. [ ] is the women's change room and [ ] is the men's change room for Suite [ ]. [ ] had no knowledge of doors ever being propped open. [ ] is across from [ ]. The airlock between [ ] and the [ ] side is [ ]. The letters may have been stored in [ ] at some point.

[ ] thought that the gloveboxes that were used to process the letters were purchased new by the FBI for that specific purpose. [ ] advised that two keys are needed to open of these gloveboxes, and therefore two people must be present as each person only had access to one key. [ ] did not know if the glovebox was used for all four letters, [ ] would have the list of those who had access to the keys.

b6  
b7C

There are currently passbox and airlock logs, however these were not in place during the time that the letter evidence was at USAMRIID. It is now required that the passboxes be wiped down with bleach after each use, however that policy was also not in place during the time that the letters were handled at USAMRIID.

An office supply vending machine with a swipe card mechanism was located in a hallway near a Pepsi machine.

[ ] showed the agents Room [ ] where there are numerous incubators, some of which were there prior to receipt of the letters. [ ] thought it would be difficult to keep a lot of material unnoticed in an incubator in Building [ ] and [ ] did not know if it would be possible to do that in Building [ ]. [ ] thought that if a lab went unused for a long time in [ ] it might be possible to keep material in an incubator undetected.

b6  
b7C

If the material was not hot, [ ]  
[ ] The following individuals worked in [ ]  
[ ]  
Some people from [ ] were in and

279A-WF-222936-[redacted] 302, 279A-BA-C10139

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted]

, On 01/13/2003 , Page 7

out of [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] showed the agents the Clinical Lab (Clin Lab) which is part of DSD and operationally under the supervision of [redacted] Personnel have their blood and urine tests done at the Clin Lab and prior to the implementation of SIP, the Clin Lab provided all medical services to personnel. SIP is responsible for providing immunizations, physicals, and mask fit tests. None of the hot areas can be accessed through the Clin Lab.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/20/2003

On February 11, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, [redacted] telephone [redacted] by Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. [redacted] who was already familiar with the identities of the interviewing agents, provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

For items such as paper and stationery, [redacted] usually shops at [redacted] [redacted] has purchased envelopes at [redacted] [redacted] The only paper, other than copier/laser printer paper, [redacted] used while [redacted] worked at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) was 5" by 7" lined tablets on which [redacted] kept [redacted] "to-do" lists. [redacted] obtained those tablets from the supply cabinet in the Division Office. The computer paper was usually in boxes stacked in the hallway near the change rooms for suites B3 and B4, or in the cabinets there. [redacted]

[redacted] cannot recall any occasion when [redacted] picked up paper in a store, did not purchase it, and put it back on the shelf.

The only copy machines [redacted] used at USAMRIID were the library copier and the one located by the rear entrance to building 1425. [redacted] never used public copy machines except for the one at the Public Library in [redacted]

The Post Office [redacted] routinely used was the one on [redacted] and [redacted] used the stamp vending machines there. [redacted] has also used the [redacted] Post Office.

[redacted] shops at the grocery store at the [redacted] and the [redacted] takes [redacted] dry cleaning to the cleaners in [redacted] and also uses a [redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7EInvestigation on 2/11/03 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-3234 279A-BA-C101392Date dictated 2/14/03by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 2/11/03

, Page 2

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never purchased [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] has several that [REDACTED] has had for years.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have eaten at the [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] but they do not eat out very often.

At USAMRIID, there was a common stock of zippered plastic bags stored in the hallway outside the [REDACTED]. The bags were not Ziploc brand and came on a roll with bags attached to each other at the openings. The roll of bags was secured by a rubber band. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] experiments. Anyone using the supply of bags would have to pick up the roll and tear off the bags they needed, then replace the roll. The bags were approximately gallon size. [REDACTED] does not know if the same bags were used for packaging the anthrax letters.

[REDACTED] in progress at the time the letters were received at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not recall the exact dates or days of the week, but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would have used the common stock of zipper bags during this period and would have handled the whole roll of bags in order to take what [REDACTED] needed.

All of the [REDACTED] research was conducted in Suite [REDACTED]. Animal species were kept separate, so the [REDACTED] were in a separate room from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] went into suite [REDACTED] almost every day. [REDACTED]



279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 2/11/03

, Page 3

[REDACTED] who worked in [REDACTED] included [REDACTED] (phonetic),  
[REDACTED] (phonetic).

[REDACTED] worked on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

b6  
b7c

[REDACTED] grew *Bacillus anthracis* for [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] as well as some that was combined with other  
batches for aerosol studies [REDACTED] (building [REDACTED]).  
A "batch" is eight flasks. [REDACTED] did obtain *Bacillus anthracis*  
from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DUGWAY could produce it in large batches. [REDACTED] always  
used the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* for the aerosol  
challenges.

IVINS used the original slant containing AMES received in  
1981 to make a new stock of Ames. For [REDACTED] work,  
[REDACTED] may have used Ames from [REDACTED] collection which would  
have originated from a stock of Ames started by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] has used IVINS' stock since then for [REDACTED] research and has used  
the same protocol for growing Ames. The protocols used by other  
researchers at USAMRIID came from IVINS and [REDACTED] in more recent  
years. [REDACTED] grows [REDACTED] *Bacillus anthracis* [REDACTED]  
and IVINS do not grow it by that technique. The protocols used by  
[REDACTED] IVINS, and other researchers at USAMRIID are published in  
an article titled "Efficacy of a human anthrax vaccine in guinea  
pigs, rabbits, and rhesus macaques against challenge by *Bacillus*  
*anthracis* isolates of diverse geographical origin". [REDACTED]  
this protocol [REDACTED] and maybe [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] used a few minor variations to the published  
protocol. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 2/11/03

, Page 4

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[REDACTED] The finished product is used in intra-muscular (IM) challenges.

For aerosol studies, the product is further processed with a density gradient to get the vegetative cells and other matter out. None of the material [REDACTED] for aerosol challenges was agar-grown. [REDACTED] does not think [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] would use material that was grown on agar. [REDACTED] has not grown Ames spores on agar. The Ames sporulates very well. If left in an incubator for 24 hours, the Ames will have some spores.

[REDACTED] stored the Ames spores in 50 ml conical tubes in the [REDACTED] of suite [REDACTED]. The Ames in these tubes was for the IM challenges and was not highly purified. The ultra-pure Ames for the aerosol challenges was stored in one-liter poly flasks and was kept separate from the IM challenge material. All of the material was stored in the [REDACTED] room, but [REDACTED] may also have kept some of the Ames in the unlocked refrigerator in [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED]. Each tube was labeled with the name of the strain, the date of harvest, and the concentration.

b6  
b7C

Two flasks would produce enough material for the guinea pig work. [REDACTED] estimated that the concentration of spores was something like  $2 \times 10^8$  or  $10^9$  per ml. When the colony is initially re-suspended in 5 ml, traces of the sheep's blood agar are not visible. [REDACTED] did not document each individual tube of Ames spores [REDACTED] prepared, and it would have been possible for someone to take some of the spore prep without [REDACTED] noticing.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED] research group is the only group at USAMRIID to grow *Bacillus anthracis* on agar.

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 2/11/03

, Page 5

The Dugway samples were maintained by [REDACTED] only used the Dugway material for [REDACTED]. This study was prior to the [REDACTED]. The samples were stored in Eppendorf tubes in the [REDACTED] hallway for the [REDACTED].

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] believes some of the Dugway Ames was agar grown. [REDACTED] Dugway material was kept in the original orange screw-cap containers and was put in the refrigerator in [REDACTED] lab when [REDACTED] was finished with it.

The sheep's blood agar [REDACTED] used in [REDACTED] study was made for [REDACTED] by the Tissue Culture group at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] did not wear gloves when preparing the plates and setting up the lab for the work. The broth is only opened in the hood long enough to withdraw some with a pipette. The initial streaking of the agar plate is very brief, and the bacteria is not exposed for long.

Some people believe the entire batch of spore preparation is heat shocked at the same time, but [REDACTED] IVINS only heat shock the portion needed when they are ready to do each challenge. IVINS would usually go into the lab early and heat shock the amount needed for the aerosol challenges. [REDACTED] also heat shocked to get rid of vegetative cells and possibly to stimulate the bacteria. [REDACTED] diluted down to get the target 100 microliters from [REDACTED] stock solution and put it in a first dilution tube. That tube would be the one [REDACTED] heat shocked. The material was freshly heat-shocked each time.

[REDACTED] used [REDACTED] that makes a nice density gradient (one could use sucrose). IVINS had been using the [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] came to USAMRIID, and [REDACTED] continued to use it.

[REDACTED] is willing to take the agents on a tour of the USAMRIID laboratories where [REDACTED] worked if necessary.

[REDACTED] provided a copy of the published article which is maintained in the 1A section of the file.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/18/2003

On 04/17/2003, SA [ ] received nineteen (19) five milliliter tubes containing various amounts of irradiated, non-viable bacteria from [ ]

b6  
b7C

[ ] SA transported the tubes to the United States Army Medical Research Institute (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Ft. Detrick, Maryland, where [ ] took possession of the items and placed them in a refrigerator for storage.

The following represents the materials transferred from NMRC to USAMRIID:

Item #	Description
3	2.3 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames spore $1 \times 10^7$ cfu/ml H <sub>2</sub> O 12/18/98
4	2.5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames spore $1 \times 10^5$ cfu/ml H <sub>2</sub> O 12/18/98
31	2.5 ml 1 June 96 11.914 Ames June 96 $9.9 \times 10^8$ 1% Phenol
33	0.6 ml (+pellet) illegible <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames Spores NSM? /29/ 1% Phenol
34	5 ml LD Ames 1 large pellet
35	1.3 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames $1 \times 10^8$ cfu/ml H <sub>2</sub> O Lot 02398
36	5 ml Bruce Ames LD Resuspended to 0.1 g/ml H <sub>2</sub> O original spore prep, raw not purified, From Bruce LD Ivins $1.2 \times 10^9$ 1% Phenol
37	5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames Lot 112997 in NSM Wash 1 of 4
38	5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> spores Ames Lot 112997 in NSM Wash 2 of 4
39	5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> spores Ames Lot 112997 in NSM Wash 3 of 4
40	5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames Lot 112997 in NSM Wash 4 of 4


Investigation on 04/17/2003 at Silver Spring, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 - 302 - 3279 Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by SA [ ]

b6  
b7C

b6  
b7C  
b7E



back of page

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 04/17/2003, Page 2

41	5 ml Ames 12/1/99 Combo
42	5 ml Ames $10^{10}$ original $1 \times 10^{10}$ Rewash
43	5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames Lot 31 July 97 BASP Renografin purified 8/5/97 $4.4 \times 10^8$ cfu/ml 1% Phenol - Dry
44	5 ml Renografin purified 1-9-92 Ames spores resuspended to 0.1g/ml 1% Phenol $1.26 \times 10^9$ - Dry
46	5 ml Ames spores Renografin repurified 4/10/92 $8.3 \times 10^6$ 1% Phenol SBA Lot 41092
47	5 ml NSM Purified Ames spores Renografin prepared 01/21/92 stored in 1% Phenol (C?H) $7.9 \times 10^8$ <i>B. cereus</i>
48	5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames Leighton DOI
49	5 ml <i>B. anthracis</i> Ames NSM liquid

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/30/2003

On April 29, 2003, [redacted] date  
of birth [redacted] social security account number [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at  
[redacted] place of employment [redacted]

b6  
b7c

[redacted] telephone [redacted]  
After being advised of the identities of the agents  
and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

[redacted] was awarded [redacted] degree by the [redacted]  
[redacted] and received [redacted] in [redacted]  
or [redacted] from [redacted] University. [redacted]  
[redacted] at the United States Army Medical  
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).

[redacted] was next assigned to [redacted] at USAMRIID  
where [redacted] worked with [redacted] At the same time,  
[redacted] worked on and received [redacted] from [redacted]  
University through the [redacted] All of  
[redacted] research was done at USAMRIID, and it was primarily in [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] as a [redacted] is  
currently employed by [redacted]  
[redacted] and works as a [redacted]

[redacted] did not actually work hands on with *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) and never grew any B.a. spores [redacted] although  
some of the people [redacted] did. [redacted] never saw the  
original B.a. Ames sample at USAMRIID as [redacted] was not working in the  
[redacted] when it was received. While [redacted] was the  
[redacted]

[redacted] in association with [redacted]

Investigation on 04/29/2003 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 3539  
279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 302, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted] - 806

b6  
b7c  
b7E

279A-WF-222936- [ ] 302, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 04/29/2003, Page 2

b6  
b7C

clinical trials for *B.a.* vaccines. [ ] worked with [ ]  
[ ] advised  
that *B.a.* does not look like itself without its two plasmids. [ ]

[ ]  
The strain of *B.a.* used for these studies was not Ames, but was  
[ ] This strain started out as attenuated, but  
was not avirulent.

[ ]

[ ]  
[ ]

[ ] a project to obtain very clean  
*B.a.* Ames spore preparations from Dugway Proving Grounds in the  
late 1990s. BRUCE IVINS [ ] worked hands on with the  
material, [ ]

During suite closures for renovations, freezers would  
usually be moved to the warehouse area in the rear corner of the  
building near the loading dock. This area was adjacent to Suite [ ]  
and was an addition built at USAMRIID. Freezers were kept locked  
any time they were outside of a containment area. A keycard was  
needed in order to obtain access to the warehouse area, and all of  
the freezers had a key lock. In addition, the freezers were taped  
shut and had alarms.

[ ] primary work area while at USAMRIID was Room  
[ ] in Suite [ ] of Building [ ] worked with [ ]



279A-WF-222936-[ ] 302, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 04/29/2003, Page 3

in this lab. When Suite B4 was shut down for renovation, the freezers that had been located outside of Room [ ] in the hallway were either moved to Suite B3, decontaminated to remain in Suite [ ] during the renovations, or moved to the warehouse area.

[ ] did not know [ ] and never knew [ ] to be in Suite [ ] was the only person that [ ] knew to have contact with [ ]

b6  
b7C

Piggybacking through doorways around USAMRIID occurred during the time that [ ] was employed there. Piggybacking could also happen in the hot suites, as one person may not use their pin number if they were going through the door at the same time as someone else. When [ ] worked at USAMRIID, people knew each other well enough to recognize who belonged there because of the small number of employees. [ ] advised that there are probably a couple hundred more employees currently at USAMRIID than were there when [ ] left in [ ]. Most of these new employees are contractors.

[ ] has never used a lyophilizer. [ ] recalled one lyophilizer in the Bacteriology Division located in Suite B5. The doors to Suite B5 were kept open during the day, therefore access to the lyophilizer would not have been limited. When the doors were locked, anyone in the Bacteriology Division would have had access. [ ] was also aware that the Toxinology Division had some small lyophilizers, and advised that there were probably some others scattered around USAMRIID.

b6  
b7C

[ ] advised that within the area where a person worked, for example a hot suite, the freezers were not kept locked, however all regulatory requirements were still being met. Because of storage problems, people entered each other's freezers frequently. There was not a two person rule in effect while [ ] was at USAMRIID, and people would often come in to work alone on the weekends.

b6  
b7C

It was common for USAMRIID personnel to know what the people around them were working on, and therefore to also know what materials were used in their studies. These materials were stored with the researcher's name and a code number. When people left USAMRIID, they usually did not clear out their work materials because they did not know if someone would want to use them after they left.

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 02, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 04/29/2003 , Page 4

b6  
b7C

[ ] could not imagine that anyone in [ ] group at USAMRIID was responsible for the fall 2001 anthrax mailings. [ ] could see someone perhaps sending B.a. to a superior at work, but not through the public mail system. [ ] could not imagine someone doing it to raise money for biodefense or to demonstrate to Congress that money was needed for such biodefense efforts.

It would have been difficult for someone to prepare the mailings at USAMRIID. There was a very small group of people working on B.a., and most of these people worked together. There were fermentors in Suite B4 that could have been used, however it would have been necessary for two people to work together to operate this equipment. [ ] does not think that someone would have taken a wet B.a. spore prep out of USAMRIID. Someone would have noticed if a large quantity of B.a. Ames was being grown.

The manner in which the mailings were sent was not the optimal method if the goal was to kill a large number of people. The mailer could have made the same point using B.a. Stearne. It would have taken until the plasma preparation or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) results came back before the panic would have died down. It made more sense to [ ] that someone outside the country sent the letters as an act of economic terrorism, rather than to kill people. The clean up and aftermath have probably cost billions of dollars. In a few years, the real impact of the mailings on the economy will be seen. For example, hoof and mouth disease has cost the United Kingdom (UK) ten billion dollars. If the UK was to vaccinate their animals, they would not be allowed to export their meat to countries without hoof and mouth disease. [ ] described additional consequences of the anthrax mailings. There are currently more Biosafety Level (BL) 4 labs being planned for construction in the United States than can be staffed by qualified scientists.

B.a. is one of the easiest organisms to work with. There are certain tricks of the trade that could be used to get very high purity and that could be learned from the literature. For example, some very pure samples have been made at USAMRIID for aerosol challenges. [ ] has not read the literature about how to dry B.a., but [ ] has been told that it is not that difficult to do. There are certain tricks to drying B.a. that could be learned from the offensive bioweapons program. [ ] does not know if this information would be sufficient to obtain the B.a. as pure and dry as the material in the letters.

279A-WF-222936-[ ] 302, 279A-BA-C101392

b6  
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [ ]

, On 04/29/2003, Page 5

Information from the offensive weapons program has been passed on from some of the "old timers", as well as from preparedness scenarios over the last few years. A number of people from the Bacteriology Division who have worked on problems with the "old timers", as well as people who have attended certain classified briefings, know of offensive program information.

[ ] advised that the passing of this knowledge is "all within the system". The "old timers" are training the next generation to protect the country, thus some information needs to be shared.

A number of people have knowledge of the secrets related to working with B.a. It is not a difficult agent to work with, and equipment is available to protect oneself while working with it. One could set up a cabinet and use it to prepare the letters if they were not concerned that someone would be collecting a soil sample contaminated with B.a. It would be difficult to do without leaving behind a trace.

A different equipment set up is required for working with a dry B.a. aerosol as opposed to a wet B.a. aerosol. [ ] some of the first wet aerosol experiments when USAMRIID started doing aerosols again [ ] It was difficult to convince the USAMRIID Commander at the time of the necessity of aerosol studies, as the institute had become a very public entity and the stigma from the offensive bioweapons program remained. [ ] had no knowledge of any dry B.a. work at USAMRIID.

The official USAMRIID archive culture collection is kept in Suite [ ] Principal Investigators (PIs) can submit their samples to the collection, although it is not required. There are collections of B.a. spores from other researchers in the archives, and [ ] was not sure if all of those are wet spore preparations.

b6  
b7C

There is a large collection of B.a. in the Bacteriology Division which is currently administered by IVINS and stored in Suite B4. PERRY MIKESELL, who now works for Battelle Memorial Laboratory, was involved with getting the B.a. for the collection in the late 1970s or early 1980s. [ ] advised that these may not all be wet spore preparations.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/28/2002

[redacted]  
[redacted] United States Army Military Research Institute  
for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located at Fort Detrick,  
Maryland. [redacted] was advised that [redacted] was being interviewed  
concerning [redacted] knowledge of [redacted] and [redacted] activities while  
at USAMRIID. Inspector [redacted] United States Postal  
Inspection Service, was present for the interview. After being  
advised as to the nature of the interview and the identity of the  
interviewing investigators, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised that [redacted] had very little first hand  
knowledge of [redacted] While [redacted] was working at USAMRIID [redacted]  
was assigned as [redacted] does not  
recall having seen [redacted] at USAMRIID and did not recognize the  
picture of [redacted] as having seen [redacted] prior.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7E

Investigation on 08/19/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392 [redacted] dictated 08/28/2002 [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

Y&N

279A-WF-222936-4330 [redacted]  
SUB 302-3679 7-29-03

279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 08/19/2002, Page 2

b6  
b7C

Several years ago [REDACTED] gave a presentation on Ft. Detrick. [REDACTED] could not recall the exact location of the presentation, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] thought the presentation took place in [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] would have logs as to who had given presentations on Ft. Detrick.

[REDACTED] is aware of a situation where a retired individual brought in old paint cans which contained vials of Anthrax. [REDACTED] believes that Bruce Ivins would have information concerning this. [REDACTED] recalled that this person had the cans stored in a garage and came across them while cleaning out the garage. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of [REDACTED] being involved with these samples.

When asked if [REDACTED] knew of anyone who would commit the act of mailing Anthrax, [REDACTED] was unaware of anyone who would. [REDACTED] felt as though the individual did not intend to harm anyone as one of the letters spoke of taking antibiotics.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/20/2002b6  
b7C  
b7E

[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment on September 20, 2002, by Special Agent [redacted] and Postal Inspector, [redacted] was advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview. [redacted] then provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] is a [redacted] assigned to the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located at Ft. Detrick, Maryland. [redacted] work telephone number is [redacted] is assigned to the [redacted] and works on [redacted] studies. [redacted]

[redacted] Instead, [redacted] will continue [redacted] current work at USAMRIID, but will do so as a [redacted]

[redacted] has been at USAMRIID for approximately [redacted] years. During that time, [redacted] never met [redacted] and had no personal contact with [redacted] that [redacted] could recall. [redacted] now knows who [redacted] is, [redacted]

[redacted] noted that when [redacted] saw [redacted] then recalled that [redacted] was the person at USAMRIID that [redacted]

[redacted] recalled that on a few occasions [redacted] started to say something to a person [redacted] believed was [redacted] and then realized that it was the other person [redacted]

[redacted] works in Building [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] has access to the [redacted] BL-3 hot suites (the areas at USAMRIID where research is performed [redacted] used to have access to some of the [redacted] suites due to the fact that [redacted]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 08-21-02 at Ft. Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 09-20-02

, Page 2

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] work involved research on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Now, in order for a non-Bacteriology Division personnel to get access to one of those hot suites, special access clearance must be requested. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has participated in *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) challenges as part of [REDACTED] research projects. [REDACTED] works on [REDACTED] studies [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] participated in some challenges [REDACTED] which involved the Ames strain of Ba, but all of those studies occurred within the last year. IVINS is the USAMRIID person who controls the Ames strain and provides it to those needing it for research. IVINS' laboratory technician, [REDACTED] assists with the Ba research.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of what division [REDACTED] worked in while at USAMRIID, nor did [REDACTED] know where in USAMRIID [REDACTED] did [REDACTED] work. [REDACTED] did not recall ever seeing [REDACTED] in any of the hot suites, and specifically did not recall seeing [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] never heard anything about [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know any of [REDACTED] social acquaintances. [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] both worked with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED]

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/20/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] social security number [redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place  
of business, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of  
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), located in building [redacted] at Fort  
Detrick, Maryland. Also present for the interview was Postal  
Inspector [redacted]. After being advised the identity of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

[redacted] has been working at USAMRIID for [redacted]  
[redacted] is currently the [redacted]  
[redacted] has held this position for the past [redacted] years.

[redacted] did not know [redacted] except to see [redacted]  
in the hallway and say hello. [redacted] would see [redacted]  
[redacted] and never had a conversation with [redacted] that  
[redacted] could recall. If [redacted] had a conversation, it would have  
been at one of the [redacted] and been specific to the  
[redacted] knew that [redacted] worked in building [redacted] and  
was working on the [redacted]

[redacted] stated that when equipment is to be disposed  
of, [redacted]  
The property goes to the dock and [redacted] is unaware of where it  
goes from there. [redacted] believes it would be very difficult to  
take a glove box, hood or any other large laboratory equipment  
however, it would be very easy to take smaller items such as  
pipettes and test tubes. [redacted] noted that during the Gulf War  
a fence was installed by the dock area. Prior to this fence, it  
would be very easy for an individual to back their vehicle right up  
to the dock and take whatever they wanted.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] worked on a project called a  
vaccination challenge which was done on rabbits that were first  
injected with a vaccine for Bacillus anthracis and then infected  
with the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis. The rabbits were  
ordered from [redacted] and then vaccinated by [redacted]  
[redacted] BRUCE IVINS [redacted] work with the  
Bacillus anthracis and the group they work with was responsible for

See (A) 3539  
302-3837  
Investigation on 9/19/02 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 9/20/02

by SA [redacted]



279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 9/19/02

, Page 2

b6  
b7C

infecting the rabbits for the project. IVINS [REDACTED] obtained the Ames strain from Dugway Proving Grounds located in Utah. [REDACTED] stated that all of the rabbits survived this project.

Another Challenge scheduled for sometime early 2003. This project will be an Aerosolized Challenge where the rabbits will be vaccinated again with the same vaccine and then introduced to the Ames strain via aerosolisation. [REDACTED] knows that the Ames strain will not be obtained through Dugway because since the mailings of the Anthrax letters, Dugway will no longer supply USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not know where the Bacillus anthracis will be obtained from [REDACTED]. Furthermore, [REDACTED] does not know where the Ames strain is stored at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] knows [REDACTED] and knows that [REDACTED] was responsible for all [REDACTED] was a good collaborator and a great [REDACTED] was smart and [REDACTED] was honest.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/04/2003

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social  
Security Account Number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place  
of employment, [redacted]

[redacted] work telephone [redacted] After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] began working at the United States Army Medical  
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The first biological agent with which [redacted] worked when  
[redacted] was cleared to work in the BSL-3 was Bacillus anthracis (Ba).  
[redacted] was trained in working with biological agents by [redacted]  
[redacted] USAMRIID employees.

[redacted] worked directly for, and worked mostly with, [redacted]  
[redacted] who was [redacted] at USAMRIID.  
[redacted] main responsibility was to assist in a [redacted]  
[redacted] project. In this project

[redacted]

[redacted] specific duties in the [redacted] project were to  
[redacted]

Investigation on 09/02/2003 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302279A-BA-C101392Date dictated 09/04/2003

by [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 09/02/2003 , Page 2

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

In the course of [REDACTED] work [REDACTED] worked with people from several departments within USAMRIID, including [REDACTED]. In the course of [REDACTED] work [REDACTED] obtained *Ba* strains from the stocks maintained by [REDACTED] BRUCE last name unknown (LNU) (known to interviewing agents as BRUCE IVINS). [REDACTED] also worked often with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was taught *Ba* spore production techniques by [REDACTED]. They used plate based techniques. [REDACTED] made their own plates on which to grow spores using New Sporulation Media (NSM) and used a Renographin spore purification process.

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A large batch of *Ba* was grown for each of the various strains. Since these were for quality control purposes, they took care to look closely for the presence of vegetative cells in the spore preparations, and attempted to eliminate as much of the vegetative material as possible. Spore concentrations of  $10^6$  to  $10^8$  were prepared in slurry in 25-50 milliliter (ml) bottles. The

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-302 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/02/2003, Page 3

b6  
b7C

spore preparations were placed into vials approximately 1 ml each and dried.

Approximately 100 vials of various strains were prepared in this process. The dried material was kept in a refrigerator in the [REDACTED] located in Building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] all participated in this project. [REDACTED] produced and kept the documentation related to this project.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Whenever someone at USAMRIID wanted to take a vial of the re-agent they would have to make a request through [REDACTED] who would process and approve the request.

The original live spore stock used to create the dried material was maintained in two ways: part was kept in 1% phenol solution, the rest was kept in water. The reason for keeping the stock in this way was to identify the possible differences in the spores between the two methods of storage.

The 1% phenol solution kept the live spores from growing and maintained the live spores. Live spores can be stored in this manner for up to five years without much maintenance. Spores maintained in water needed to be re-washed and re-enumerated every two weeks as spores tend to grow when kept in water.

The 1% phenol solutions were kept in USAMRIID Building [REDACTED] suite [REDACTED] in a locked freezer in a hallway. Only [REDACTED] had the key to the freezer. The water solution was kept in USAMRIID Building [REDACTED] in a refrigerator located in [REDACTED]. This laboratory was locked using an electronic keypad system. This laboratory was not accessible unless [REDACTED] was in the laboratory.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] kept materials in a walk-in cooler located on the [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-302 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/02/2003, Page 4

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never hosted a foreign visiting scientist at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does recall a visiting [REDACTED] scientist from the [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED] this scientist never actually "got in the door" at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] does not know [REDACTED] recalls seeing [REDACTED] on the [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] outside of the changing rooms. [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] laboratory. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] and others thought [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] and stayed away from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised the interviewing agent that [REDACTED] was putting together documents which would demonstrate [REDACTED] whereabouts on the dates of the anthrax letter mailings.

279A-WF-222936-302 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/02/2003, Page 5

b6  
b7C

At the conclusion of the interview [REDACTED] was requested by the interviewing agents to voluntarily submit to a polygraph examination. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] would consider the request and contact the interviewing agents at a later date with [REDACTED] decision.

[REDACTED] was re-contacted telephonically by SA [REDACTED] on 09/03/2003. During this contact [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] had neglected to state on 09/02/2003 that the 100 one ml vials of pathogens which were dried and stored in the [REDACTED] had been gamma irradiated and were not considered live agents. These vials were lyophilized by [REDACTED] using a large lyophilizer located in [REDACTED] laboratory. [REDACTED] lyophilized some of the vials [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recently asked [REDACTED] where the vials of dried pathogens were. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that the vials no longer exist. [REDACTED] advised that records regarding the disposition of the vials should be in the Safety Office or the Shipping Office of USAMRIID.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/26/2004

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment at [redacted]

[redacted] cellular phone number [redacted] After being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] received a [redacted] degree at [redacted]

[redacted] was employed by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) from [redacted] began [redacted] career at USAMRIID as a [redacted]

This position required [redacted] to [redacted] and other related duties. [redacted]

During the [redacted] timeframe, [redacted] worked on a project with [redacted] and others from [redacted] [redacted] Most of the laboratory work was conducted by [redacted] The Ames strain used for the research was obtained from BRUCE IVINS [redacted] and it was never distributed to other researchers. The Ames strain was never cultured by [redacted] nor was it ever lyophilized. The research was conducted in Suite [redacted] and stored inside a refrigerator in the room.

When [redacted] was engaged in research projects, [redacted] would be in the "hot" suites [redacted] When [redacted] laboratory work [redacted] inside the "hot" suites [redacted]

Investigation on 3/24/2004 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936; 279A-BA-C101392 - 1432 Date dictated N/A

SA [redacted]  
by SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C



SSA

back of page

b6  
b7C



279A-WF-222936; 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 3/24/2004, Page 2

b6  
b7C

frequent. However, [REDACTED] entered the "hot" suites for the purpose of [REDACTED] has never noticed anyone inside the "hot" suites that didn't belong, nor has [REDACTED] ever seen any suspicious activity. [REDACTED] believes that anyone with the intent to steal a select agent from a "hot" suite can do so without difficulty. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone who has tried to steal select agents from USAMRIID. [REDACTED] is familiar with the Room [REDACTED] walk-in cooler in Building [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has never noticed any unusual activity or unknown persons inside or near the walk-in cooler.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] does not know of anyone who has mentioned using select agents improperly. [REDACTED] does not know of anybody with hostile attitudes toward the U.S. government. [REDACTED] could not recall anybody who was lax in handling dangerous items or who was inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. [REDACTED] does not know, nor has [REDACTED] heard any rumors of people who were interested in gaining access to anthrax that didn't have clearance.

b6  
b7C

With [REDACTED] microbiology training, [REDACTED] knows how to make anthrax into a powder. [REDACTED] believes that any microbiologist would know how. However, getting the anthrax spores to a particular particle size, [REDACTED] would be more difficult.

[REDACTED] has never used plastic storage containers at USAMRIID, nor does [REDACTED] know of anyone who does. [REDACTED] has never purchased pre-stamped envelopes and does not know people who do. [REDACTED] has never handled any of the anthrax letters and has never been in the same room as the letters. [REDACTED] has never worked with the anthrax powder evidence.

[REDACTED] hosted several foreign visiting scientists while employed at USAMRIID. These foreign scientists came from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] None of the visitors ever had unescorted access in USAMRIID. None of the visitors went inside the "hot" suites. They had tours of USAMRIID but did not go to any specific rooms. None of the visiting scientists showed an interest in anthrax or weaponization techniques. They did not show any anti-American sentiments and they never asked about where to get pre-stamped envelopes.

279A-WF-222936; 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 3/24/2004, Page 3

b6  
b7c

[REDACTED] was not a member of the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] knew some people [REDACTED] who might have known  
[REDACTED] but [REDACTED] does not recall their names.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] does not, however, have any  
personal or professional ties to Trenton, NJ. During the  
September/October 2001 timeframe, [REDACTED] does not believe [REDACTED] did any  
traveling. After the anthrax mailings, [REDACTED] did conduct  
USAMRIID-related [REDACTED] as  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was asked whether [REDACTED] would agree to take a  
polygraph administered by the FBI on questions related to the  
anthrax mailings of 2001. [REDACTED] voluntarily agreed to take the  
polygraph.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/11/2004

On February 6, 2004, [redacted]  
date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted]  
[redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment,  
[redacted]  
[redacted] telephone [redacted] by Special Agents (SAs) [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities  
of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview,  
[redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C  
b7DInvestigation on 02/06/2004 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4114 Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/27/2004

[redacted], United States Army  
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort  
Detrick, Maryland, date of birth [redacted] Social Security  
Account Number [redacted], work telephone number [redacted]  
home address [redacted]  
home telephone [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 08/27/2004 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-1269Date dictated NAby SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/27/2004, Page 2

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] made antibodies and worked on [REDACTED] but not *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). [REDACTED] did not handle or work with any live agents.

In [REDACTED] accepted a position at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) [REDACTED] was assigned to the [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] has worked on the [REDACTED] While working at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] has only worked with Ba on two occasions.

In [REDACTED] assisted on a project headed by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] The project involved [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 08/27/2004, Page 3

b6  
b7C

\_\_\_\_\_ researchers would examine the plate to determine how many colonies grew per gram of animal tissue. \_\_\_\_\_ was not involved with the animal challenges and was not sure what strain of Ba was used in the challenges. \_\_\_\_\_ work on the project began once \_\_\_\_\_ stated that once colonies on the SBA plates were counted, they were autoclaved twice.

\_\_\_\_\_ a project using Ba to \_\_\_\_\_. The project included ten different experiments and live Ames Ba. \_\_\_\_\_ received the Ames Ba from BRUCE IVINS in \_\_\_\_\_ and IVINS signed paperwork acknowledging the transfer. \_\_\_\_\_ remembers receiving the Ames Ba through the pass box in either Suite \_\_\_\_\_ took the Ames Ba to Suite \_\_\_\_\_ where the experiments took place. Some of the experiments used non lethal Ames Ba, including Delta strain and another strain \_\_\_\_\_ could not remember. \_\_\_\_\_ could not remember if the Ames Ba contained any silicon. This project lasted until \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7C

\_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7C

\_\_\_\_\_ has never used the modified G sporulation media and has never been involved in a project to dry Ba. On one occasion, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ learned during \_\_\_\_\_ project that if you "do nothing" to Ba it "pretty much" turns from vegetative cells to spores.

Sometimes when the air ducts are cleaned at USAMRIID, dust would get inside the hoods and contaminate experiments but \_\_\_\_\_ could not remember any other contamination. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that USAMRIID tests buildings \_\_\_\_\_ for the presence of select agents outside of the hot suites. \_\_\_\_\_ remembers there being a positive \_\_\_\_\_ for Ames in either \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ has worked in Suite \_\_\_\_\_ (very rarely), and rooms \_\_\_\_\_ last visited Building \_\_\_\_\_ approximately \_\_\_\_\_ when \_\_\_\_\_ visited \_\_\_\_\_ lab on the \_\_\_\_\_

279A-WF-222936-302

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 08/27/2004, Page 4

"Piggy-backing" is forbidden at USAMRIID and [REDACTED] has not seen it take place. [REDACTED] could not provide an example, but [REDACTED] is sure that if someone wanted to get a Select Agent out of the Hot Suites it would be possible. [REDACTED] was not aware of anybody who talked about, or tried to remove Select Agents from the hot suites. [REDACTED] was not aware of anybody with hostile attitudes towards the government that would be involved in the anthrax-laced letter mailings. [REDACTED] does not suspect anybody of being the mailer of the anthrax-laced letters. [REDACTED] was not aware of anybody that was lax in handling select agents.

[REDACTED] was not aware of anybody trying to gain access to anthrax or any other select agent. [REDACTED] believed that anthrax could be dried using a lyophilizer, but [REDACTED] has never done it. [REDACTED] was not aware of anybody interested in getting around forensic techniques. [REDACTED] was not aware of any unofficial work being performed on anthrax. The standard operating procedure for decontaminating the safety cabinets was to spray the cabinet and turn on the UV light for 15 to 20 minutes. The type of agent used in the cabinet would then be noted on the documentation attached to the cabinet.

[REDACTED] has access to all of [REDACTED] lab notebooks. The notebook regarding the work [REDACTED] performed on the [REDACTED] is retained by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes and had not seen one until the Daschel/Leahey letters arrived at USAMRIID. That being said, [REDACTED] did not handle the envelopes personally [REDACTED] USAMRIID employees.

[REDACTED] has been to New Jersey on several occasions. Once for a job interview in [REDACTED] at a company located in a suburb on [REDACTED]. The only other time [REDACTED] has been to New Jersey was in [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has not seen any large Sterilite boxes at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] has never met [REDACTED] and had not heard of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has never been the point of contact for any foreign visitors. [REDACTED] has never been a member of the [REDACTED].

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/11/2004

[redacted]  
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] was interviewed at the [redacted]  
[redacted] Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of  
the identities of the interviewing agents and the nature of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] graduated from [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] Fort Detrick, Maryland  
where [redacted] worked at the United States Army Military Institute of  
Infectious Disease (USAMRIID). [redacted]  
[redacted]

While at USAMRIID, [redacted] was initially assigned to the  
[redacted] Division. [redacted] worked on [redacted] mostly  
using [redacted] background. In [redacted] moved from the  
[redacted] to the [redacted] In  
[redacted] was assigned to work for [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] mostly worked with [redacted] while [redacted] worked with  
[redacted] noted that [redacted] when  
[redacted] was at USAMRIID. As a result, [redacted] was not interested  
in working very hard. Others who worked in [redacted] group  
while [redacted] was there included [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] does not recall if [redacted] worked with *Bacillus*  
*anthracis* (Ba) while [redacted] worked for [redacted] Most of [redacted] work  
[redacted]

b6  
b7C

Investigation on 10/11/2004 at [redacted]

File # 279A-WF-222936-302 4282

Date dictated 10/11/2004

SA [redacted]  
by SA [redacted]



279A-WF-222936

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/11/2004, Page 2

at that time was with [REDACTED] did assist [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] Ba work, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Others at USAMRIID who worked with Ba included Ivins, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not know what strains of Ba [REDACTED] worked with or what they were named. [REDACTED] does not know how [REDACTED] named [REDACTED] stocks of Ba [REDACTED] is unfamiliar with the nomenclature [REDACTED] nor does [REDACTED] recognize that as something that [REDACTED] would use to name a sample of Ba. [REDACTED] does not know where [REDACTED] got [REDACTED] Ba, what [REDACTED] named [REDACTED] Ba, or the strains of Ba [REDACTED] would use. [REDACTED] stressed that [REDACTED] did not usually work with Ba. [REDACTED] could not recall the first time [REDACTED] worked with Ba. [REDACTED] could not recall if [REDACTED] ever grew Ba, although [REDACTED] explained that USAMRIID was in the business of growing Ba, and other organisms, to test against animals to see if they could then save the animals.

While in [REDACTED] worked both in building [REDACTED] and building [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED] worked on animal challenges. [REDACTED] could not remember the room in which these challenges occurred, but [REDACTED] remembers these rooms were [REDACTED] of building [REDACTED] was aware of animal challenges [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] that were run by [REDACTED] although [REDACTED] can't recall if [REDACTED] ever went to any of these challenges [REDACTED]. In building [REDACTED] mostly worked in suite [REDACTED] was a cold lab. If [REDACTED] needed to do hot work, [REDACTED] would work in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] mainly worked in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] assisted [REDACTED] in this suites. [REDACTED] described an agent repository that was kept at USAMRIID somewhere in suites [REDACTED] remembers this repository because [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not recall providing Ba to anyone. [REDACTED] thought that any removal of an agent from the repository would be documented somewhere at USAMRIID.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/11/2004, Page 3

b6  
b7c

Entry into any of the hot suites at USAMRIID required an electronic identification badge. If you forgot this badge, security would issue you a temporary badge. It was rare for anyone to allow someone else into a lab who did not have a badge. Although some people would let you into the main entrance to the building, most people would not allow you to enter a hot suite without a badge. [REDACTED] does not recall anyone in particular entering a hot suite without a badge. [REDACTED] did not sponsor any visiting scientists while in the labs and does not recall escorting any visitors. Although USAMRIID management may have asked to escort individuals into the labs, [REDACTED] can not recall anyone in particular. [REDACTED] explained that USAMRIID was very conscious of security, even before the September 11th attacks. However, it would not have been difficult for someone to take Ba from USAMRIID. All someone would have to do is place a vial in their pocket and remove it from the hot suites. [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone actually taking any Ba out of the hot suites, [REDACTED] only explained that this would not be difficult to accomplish.

[REDACTED] is not aware of any contaminants that caused problems for researchers at USAMRIID. Although contamination is a common problem when growing organisms, [REDACTED] does not recall any specific problems while [REDACTED] was there. Researchers work to limit contamination because contamination will ruin their cultures. [REDACTED] is unaware of any genetic mutations or variants of Ba that were encountered at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was not familiar genetic variants and would not know if [REDACTED] ever worked with them.

[REDACTED]

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, [REDACTED] does not recall traveling. Although [REDACTED] can not remember [REDACTED] exact whereabouts in September and October of 2001, [REDACTED] is sure [REDACTED] was in New Jersey. [REDACTED] agreed to review [REDACTED] credit card and telephone records to see if [REDACTED] could determine [REDACTED] whereabouts in the weeks after September 11, 2001. [REDACTED] used to work for [REDACTED] outside of [REDACTED] worked there from approximately [REDACTED] visited [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 10/11/2004, Page 4

b6  
b7C

there on a few occasions when [REDACTED] took [REDACTED] to have lunch at a [REDACTED] is not aware of any other visits to Princeton, other than at [REDACTED] provided agents with a business card from [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was working at [REDACTED]. A copy of this business card is maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.

[REDACTED] is unfamiliar with the pre-franked envelopes used in the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001. [REDACTED] reviewed a photograph of one of the envelopes used in these attacks and was not familiar with that type of envelope. [REDACTED] has not previously seen that type of envelope and did not know where someone would purchase it.

At the conclusion of the interview, [REDACTED] agreed to take a polygraph regarding any knowledge or involvement in the anthrax attacks of 2001.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/06/2004

[redacted]  
[redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
Social Security Account Number [redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at the  
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Frederick, Maryland  
Amerithrax #3 offsite by Special Agents [redacted]  
[redacted] After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided  
the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] attended  
[redacted] University [redacted] until [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Investigation on 12/03/2004 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-A303Date dictated NAb6  
b7C

by [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 12/03/2004, Page 2

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A copy of the article was provided to the interviewing agents by [REDACTED]

The study was given the internal USAMRIID tracking number Protocol [REDACTED] and was documented and approved by USAMRIID command. The study took place on [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] NHPs were transferred from Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID to a lower section of Building [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was unsure of exactly where the NHPs were transferred to). After being transferred, the NHPs were subjected to an aerosol challenge of the Ames strain of *Ba* and

b6  
b7C  
b7F

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At the conclusion of the challenge, initial swab samples were collected then the NHPs were transferred to Suite [REDACTED] Room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] After all of the swabs were taken, the samples were plated out and the colonies were counted based on each colony-forming unit (CFU) per swab. [REDACTED] performed some of the counting but most of the work was done by [REDACTED] is not aware of what was done with the plates after the colonies were counted. A handwritten flow chart labeled [REDACTED] [REDACTED] documenting the abovementioned study was provided to the interviewing agents by [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] stated the Ames strain of *Ba* used in the aerosol challenge for this study was obtained from IVINS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was [REDACTED] of the aerosol challenge but IVINS did most of the work preparing the *Ba*-Ames for aerosolization. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] remembered some lab technicians helping with the aerosol challenge but [REDACTED] did not remember their names. The other main participants in the study were [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 12/03/2004 , Page 3

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] determine what dose of Ba would best replicate a dose encountered during a biological attack. This information was passed on to IVINS who then prepared the Ames Ba for the challenge. [REDACTED] was not sure what was done with the remaining Ba left over at the conclusion of the challenge.

[REDACTED] could not remember what role [REDACTED] played in the study in order to be named as a contributor but it may have had something to do with the aerosol challenge process.

[REDACTED] was not aware of any bacterial contamination in the [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] met [REDACTED] when [REDACTED]. This took place in Room [REDACTED] of Building [REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as having a [REDACTED] heard references made at USAMRIID regarding [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] was not sure if they were true. [REDACTED] did not have any social interaction with [REDACTED] other than greetings in the hallways at USAMRIID.

Between [REDACTED] performed [REDACTED] work on the [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was not a member of the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] enjoyed [REDACTED] time at USAMRIID and did not have a person in mind that [REDACTED] felt was the mailer of the anthrax-laden letters.

[REDACTED] voluntarily agreed to submit to an FBI administered polygraph examination regarding [REDACTED] potential involvement in the mailing of the anthrax-laced letters.

[REDACTED] provided by [REDACTED] is included in the accompanying 1A envelope and a copy [REDACTED] is attached to and made part of this FD-302.

[REDACTED] is included in the accompanying 1A envelope and [REDACTED] is attached to and made part of this FD-302.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/03/2004

On September 23, 2004, [redacted]  
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account Number  
[redacted] home address [redacted]  
[redacted], was interviewed at [redacted] place  
of employment, [redacted]  
[redacted] work telephone [redacted]  
cellular telephone [redacted] After being advised of the  
identities of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the  
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] began employment with the [redacted]  
[redacted] Currently, [redacted] is an [redacted]  
[redacted] laboratory is located  
in the [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] research focused on determining the effects of  
[redacted] Mice  
were employed in studies involving exposures to [redacted] anthrax,  
[redacted] were  
also evaluated in [redacted] laboratory. A primary goal of the  
research was to [redacted]  
[redacted]  
described the majority of the work as [redacted] or  
[redacted]. To ensure accurate  
dosing, controlled delivery systems were used. Such systems  
included intra-nasal and intra-tracheal introductions of the  
biological agent. Aerosolization studies were not conducted at  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

(X)  
[redacted]

Investigation on 09/23/2004 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302-4309

Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/23/2004, Page 2

[REDACTED] The construction of aerosolization capabilities are underway at [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

For a given biological agent, material was typically produced [REDACTED] laboratory. As an example, [REDACTED] noted that the last batch of [REDACTED] generated in [REDACTED] laboratory lasted [REDACTED]. Typically, approximately 50 milliliters (mL) of material, with a concentration of  $10^6$ - $10^7$  organisms, were generated. The batch of bacteria was aliquoted and used in all subsequent studies. According to [REDACTED] using material from the same production run decreased the number of variables to consider in a group of experiments. In preparation for an animal challenge, an aliquot of material was diluted. [REDACTED] estimated that 5,000 to 10,000 organisms were enough to expose hundreds of animals. Once a vial of material was accessed for dilution, any residual material in the original tube was discarded after the experiment.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] did not prefer the agar plate growth method, as "a lot of extra junk" was present in the spore preparation when the bacteria was grown on agar plates. Agar plates were used in [REDACTED] laboratory only for titering purposes.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] received the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) from BRUCE IVINS of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). [REDACTED] was put in contact with IVINS through a [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] of USAMRIID knew each other well at that time. [REDACTED] did not recall the exact date of the shipment; however, [REDACTED] estimated that the material was received some time around [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] speculated that IVINS sent ~1 mL of  $10^8$  Ames spores in one screw-top tube. [REDACTED] believed that the spores were frozen.

During the interview, [REDACTED] located the EA101 documenting the transfer of B.a. Ames from IVINS. The EA101 indicated that one tube, containing 500 microliters ( $\mu$ L) of spores at  $3 \times 10^9$ /mL, was shipped to [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] notified the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) regarding receipt of the material, as [REDACTED] was not confident that USAMRIID personnel would file the appropriate paperwork.

[REDACTED] group did not access the material sent by IVINS until [REDACTED]. The original material was aliquoted into multiple vials. Each vial was labeled as "OS1," denoting that



279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/23/2004, Page 3

the material derived from the "original stock". [REDACTED] recalled that approximately 9 vials of OS1 were generated and approximately 7 vials remained. [REDACTED] set aside two vials of OS1 after receiving a preservation order from Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

The original B.a. Ames stock from IVINS, identified as OS1, was used to generate a new stock of spores identified as "NS1," where "NS" denoted "new stock". [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C

Additional spore preparations were generated in [REDACTED] laboratory after May 2002. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] showed the interviewing Agents a copy of the paperwork sent to AUSA [REDACTED] in response to a Grand Jury Subpoena. [REDACTED] provided the interviewing Agents with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3  
b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 09/23/2004, Page 4 b6 b7C

by [REDACTED] during the interview are maintained in the 1A section of the file.

[REDACTED] typically employed *B.a.* Ames for [REDACTED] stated that due to the high virulence of *B.a.* Ames, exposure often killed the mice too quickly for use in [REDACTED] animal model studies.

[REDACTED] did not have established collaborations with USAMRIID investigators. [REDACTED]

None of [REDACTED] collaborators have conducted studies in [REDACTED] laboratory; mostly because [REDACTED] [REDACTED] *B.a.* researchers visited [REDACTED] to give presentations. [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] gave a presentation to [REDACTED] department. [REDACTED] visited [REDACTED] and talked with [REDACTED]

Approximately [REDACTED] sent an Ames slant, generated from [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The material was shipped to [REDACTED] also sent one stock of live Ames spores to [REDACTED] in early [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would isolate bacteria from the tissue of exposed animals; however, the infected tissue was destroyed after a count of the material was conducted. In [REDACTED] experience, the number of organisms, or vegetative cells, in infected tissue was diminished by freeze/thaw cycles.

[REDACTED] had "no clue" how to dry bacteria using a lyophilizer, while retaining viability. Lyophilizers were not maintained in the building where [REDACTED] laboratory was located. [REDACTED] indicated that lyophilizers were likely present in the building [REDACTED] On one occasion, [REDACTED] was in need of dry liposomal material. The material was transferred to [REDACTED] where it was dried by [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 09/23/2004, Page 5

personnel in that department. Once dried, the liposomes were  
returned to

b6  
b7c

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/25/2006

On January 25, 2006, [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] work telephone  
number [redacted] and [redacted]  
was telephonically interviewed. After being advised of the  
identity of the interviewing agent, and a verification call  
conducted through the Washington Field Office, Command and  
Tactical Operation Center, [redacted] provided the following  
information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] attended the [redacted]  
[redacted] beginning in the [redacted] and graduated in the  
[redacted]

[redacted] was not familiar with anyone by the name BRUCE  
IVINS, [redacted]  
[redacted] had no associations with [redacted] and [redacted]  
only religious affiliation was with the [redacted]

Without being prompted, [redacted] shared what [redacted]  
considered to be the only odd incident that occurred while  
attending [redacted] During [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] The incident was not reported  
and stopped immediately after [redacted] changed [redacted]

Attached is a copy of an e-mail, obtained from 1B-4072,  
between [redacted] and BRUCE E. IVINS, dated [redacted]  
in which [redacted] identified a [redacted] by the name  
of [redacted] who attended the [redacted]

Investigation on 01/25/2006 at Falls Church, VA (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4559 Date dictated 01/25/2006

by SA [redacted] [redacted]

b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


Date of transcription 01/23/2006

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] Date of birth [redacted] work  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of  
employment. After being advised of the identities of the  
interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]  
provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

[redacted] received an email message from BRUCE IVINS on  
[redacted] The message was sent from the email  
address KingBadger7@aol.com and was sent to [redacted]  
[redacted] The email discussed the fact that  
[redacted] never told IVINS that [redacted]  
[redacted] is not sure how IVINS would have found that  
information. The email also discussed how he had been  
interviewed over 30 times by the FBI in relation to the anthrax  
letter investigation. [redacted] provided a copy of the email to  
the interviewing Agents. This copy is attached to and made part  
of this document.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] would provide any assistance  
necessary to Amerithrax investigators if needed.

Investigation on 01/19/2006 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302 4028

Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by [redacted]  
[redacted]b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6  
b7CDate of transcription 04/03/2006

[redacted]  
[redacted] telephone number [redacted]  
cellular telephone number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted]  
[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Account  
Number (SSAN) [redacted] was advised of the identities of the  
interviewing Agent and Task Force Officer and thereafter provided  
the following information:

[redacted] was asked if [redacted] had heard of telephone number  
[redacted] to which [redacted] advised [redacted] had never heard of the number.

[redacted]  
[redacted] While at the United States Army  
Medical Research Institute of Infections Disease (USAMRIID), [redacted]  
worked in [redacted]

[redacted]  
mentioned in a previous interview that flasks were used during  
culture techniques. [redacted] was asked if these flasks were filled  
with spores and if they were vegetative cells. [redacted] advised that  
to the best of [redacted] recollection, they were filled with a 50/50  
split between spores and vegetative cells in the flask. [redacted]  
stated [redacted] was the [redacted]  
for [redacted] and completed the culture process.  
[redacted] would [redacted] only when needed in Room [redacted]  
estimated the frequency to which [redacted] was [redacted]  
[redacted] advised [redacted] normal section was [redacted] was  
not sure what method was used with the Ba. [redacted] described [redacted]  
[redacted]

[redacted] was shown photocopies of pictures labeled GLP/RMR  
1029, which was four different angles of one flask. [redacted] advised  
[redacted] did not recognize the flask and did not recall Room [redacted]  
[redacted] advised [redacted] had not heard of "Dugway Spores". [redacted] was  
asked how Ba was stored while in the laboratory. [redacted] stated [redacted]  
was not sure because [redacted] worked in [redacted] where [redacted] was stored.  
[redacted] was asked to clarify what [redacted] stated in a previous interview,  
"No one ever talked about weaponization of Ba". [redacted] clarified that  
since they were a research facility, no one talked about  
weaponization of Ba. [redacted] was asked if they ever talk about a  
worse case scenario if the Ba were to get in the wrong hands.

b6  
b7C  
b7FInvestigation on 03/29/2006 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302-4678Date dictated 03/29/2006by SA [redacted]  
TFO [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-LEAD

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 03/29/2006, Page 2

b6  
b7c

\_\_\_\_\_ stated the only worse case they discussed was if a tube broke. \_\_\_\_\_ stated there were no rumors, that \_\_\_\_\_ was aware of, reference weaponization of Ba. \_\_\_\_\_ was not under the impression studies of weaponization of Ba occurred at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ was asked about Dr. Bruce Ivins. \_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ never really talked with Dr. Ivins, but thought he was odd. \_\_\_\_\_ based this description on his knowledge of Ba and behavior. \_\_\_\_\_ stated "small things" would upset him and his outward mannerisms would show. \_\_\_\_\_ did not observe physical action taken based on his state of being upset. \_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ based \_\_\_\_\_ opinion on Dr. Ivins' home life which \_\_\_\_\_ knew about based on information \_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ and therefore Ivins wanted to control his work life.

\_\_\_\_\_ advised any doctor in the micro biologist field would know how to dry Ba. \_\_\_\_\_ stated there was no dryers, however, there was equipment to start the Ba vegetation strain which could be placed on a plate and dried. \_\_\_\_\_ advised Room \_\_\_\_\_ was a \_\_\_\_\_ and no Ba Ames strain was stored in Room \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ strains were already in the laboratory when \_\_\_\_\_ started working at USAMRIID.

\_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ area of responsibility, while working \_\_\_\_\_ was that of a \_\_\_\_\_ was in charge of \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ did not recall working with Ba studies. \_\_\_\_\_ was asked if \_\_\_\_\_ was involved with aerosol challenges and Intramuscular (IM) or Intraperitoneal (IP) challenges. \_\_\_\_\_ confirmed \_\_\_\_\_ was involved with aerosol challenges on \_\_\_\_\_ but not IM or IP. \_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ was not involved in aerosol challenges in Building \_\_\_\_\_. \_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ only recalled being in Building \_\_\_\_\_ for working with other \_\_\_\_\_ but not on aerosol challenges. \_\_\_\_\_ was asked if \_\_\_\_\_ attended the Fourth Annual Anthrax Conference in 2001 in Annapolis, Maryland, \_\_\_\_\_ stated \_\_\_\_\_ did not because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ was asked in Building 1425, Suites B3/B4, did \_\_\_\_\_ ever identify unknown persons in the laboratory to which \_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ did not. \_\_\_\_\_ stated the animal caretakers were the individuals that ran the autoclave, however, \_\_\_\_\_ did not recall any

279A-WF-222936-LEAD

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/29/2006, Page 3

b6  
b7C

of the animal caretakers names. [REDACTED] was not aware of the destruction protocols. [REDACTED] was asked if it was general knowledge that Ames was in B3/B4 and to describe the walk-in coolers. [REDACTED] stated it was not general knowledge, but on a need-to-know basis. [REDACTED] did not recall seeing walk-in coolers in B3/B4, but knew they were in B5, however, was not aware of the contents. [REDACTED] was asked if Bruce Ivins always distributed Ames or was there an honor system. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not know. [REDACTED] stated that infectious items were kept in B3/B4, which was a very secure area and [REDACTED] did not believe anyone could take samples and just leave a note.

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was asked to list persons with whom [REDACTED] worked or had direct contact with in the suites. [REDACTED] advised the main person was [REDACTED] which [REDACTED] could not recall names. [REDACTED] was asked if anyone would notice dry work being done or storage of dry powders/stimulants or otherwise. [REDACTED] stated dry work would be noticed and [REDACTED] did not observe any dry work or storage of dry powder. [REDACTED] stated this would not happen since there was no personal protective equipment (PPE) located in the area. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] made any observations with co-workers, specifically, [REDACTED] Bruce Ivins, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not know of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised Bruce Ivins was simply an odd person, as stated earlier in the interview. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was a very "power hungry person" who put [REDACTED] on edge. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as someone that always thought [REDACTED] was right. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was the person that would always disseminate office gossip and had provided information on Ivins which caused [REDACTED] to have [REDACTED] opinion of him being odd.

[REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to which [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] does not know any of the aforementioned individuals. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew of a soldier whose name was something like [REDACTED] to which [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not.

[REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] was familiar with the fermenters, to which [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was not. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] to which [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] knew of [REDACTED] but never worked with [REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED] avoided [REDACTED] since they always had [REDACTED] but knew [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not know anyone else that used the fermenter. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew if [REDACTED] ever let people into [REDACTED] lab to hang out. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not know of anyone. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] could not identify biological agents used in the



279A-WF-222936-LEAD

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 03/29/2006, Page 4

b6  
b7c

fermenter or corresponding times. [REDACTED] did not know anything about virulent Ames being used in the fermenter. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew if the fermenter was loaned out to other researchers or other facilities. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] did not know of this occurring and further stated the portability of a fermenter was equivalent to a "Mac Truck" as being very hard to move. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew the protocols for bacteria grown in the fermenter and if spores of any bacteria were produced in the fermenter, to which both [REDACTED] did not know. [REDACTED] was asked to identify any individuals who showed a special interest in the fermenter or discussed producing Ames to which [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was not aware of anyone fitting this description. [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew of equipment logs/records which would show when the fermenter was used, to which [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did not.

[REDACTED] had no additional information or questions for the interviewing Agent and Task Force Officer.



279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/29/2005, Page 2

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has been employed at USAMRIID [REDACTED] period of employment was in the [REDACTED] and lasted from [REDACTED] through [REDACTED] [REDACTED] noted there were numerous sub-branches within the [REDACTED] Division, and [REDACTED] could not recall the names of the sub-branches, or which sub-branches encompassed the labs [REDACTED] worked in. [REDACTED] was employed full-time, earning a salary of [REDACTED] per year, as a [REDACTED] For approximately the [REDACTED] of this period, [REDACTED] worked in the laboratory [REDACTED] then worked in the laboratory [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] followed by approximately [REDACTED] in the laboratory [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were both conducting research in an effort to develop [REDACTED] [REDACTED] explained that the current [REDACTED] and their research was focused on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not work with bacillus anthracis, or any components of bacillus anthracis, in any capacity while working in their labs. [REDACTED] was conducting similar research, but was also involved in a project [REDACTED] in collaboration with scientists in different research facilities. This project was related to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised this would have been the only time [REDACTED] ever worked with any component of bacillus anthracis, and [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] never worked with the living organism in any capacity.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/29/2005, Page 3

[REDACTED] was asked to provide a more detailed description of the type of work [REDACTED] conducted while working in [REDACTED] laboratories. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] performed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

During this [REDACTED] period of employment, [REDACTED] had hot suite access in building [REDACTED] noted that during all [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] employment at USAMRIID, [REDACTED] never had access to hot suites in any other building. Suites B3 and B4, located in building 1425, were the only suites that were certified for bacillus anthracis. [REDACTED] was only in Suite [REDACTED] and only on two occasions, for orientation on procedures for using the suites. On both occasions [REDACTED] was with [REDACTED] explained that you needed a pass card to enter the locker room connected to the suite, and you entered the suite through a door in the locker room. To enter the suite, you had to use your pass card a second time, and enter a pin (personal identification number). Although [REDACTED] only entered the actual hot suite laboratory on two occasions, [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did enter the locker room on a somewhat regular basis during [REDACTED] last several months of employment in [REDACTED] to use [REDACTED] locker. [REDACTED] noted that the records associated with the hot suites should show how many times [REDACTED] entered, and within seconds of [REDACTED] entry would be [REDACTED] code, [REDACTED] showing [REDACTED] was not in the suite alone.

[REDACTED]

b6  
b7Cb6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 06/29/2005, Page 4

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] began this [REDACTED] employment at USAMRIID on [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] and remained at USAMRIID until [REDACTED]  
again worked in the laboratory of [REDACTED] worked  
in building [REDACTED] and did not have access to any hot suites in any  
building. [REDACTED] noted that the hot suites were all located in  
buildings [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] operated as a [REDACTED]  
responsible for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This was a continuation of work  
[REDACTED] previously conducted with [REDACTED] work included

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not work with bacillus anthracis, or any  
components of bacillus anthracis, in any capacity.

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of , On 06/29/2005, Page 5 b6 b7C

employment at USAMRIID, which lasted until   
 was employed as a  earning a  
salary of  did not have hot suite

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/29/2005, Page 6

b6  
b7C

access during this period of employment. [REDACTED] worked in the [REDACTED] in building [REDACTED] in the laboratory of [REDACTED] work involved the [REDACTED] served as a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Working with [REDACTED] was difficult at times, because [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] would [REDACTED] and did not try to hide [REDACTED] feelings. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

With the exception of possibly conducting some [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] on bacillus anthracis [REDACTED] never worked with bacillus anthracis, or any components of bacillus anthracis, in any capacity while employed at USAMRIID, or elsewhere. The only individuals [REDACTED] is aware of that have expertise in working with bacillus anthracis, and would know about weaponization techniques, sporulation, and lyophilizing would be Bruce Ivins, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] also noted that [REDACTED] (phonetic) was in charge of the challenge/stock strains of anthrax and plague, but [REDACTED] kept very strict control of those materials. [REDACTED] was unaware of any areas of USAMRIID having problems with bacterial contamination. [REDACTED] noted that USAMRIID was working on "re-vamping" the hot suites during [REDACTED] employment.

[REDACTED] never participated in any of the challenges, and never entered the aerosol challenge labs. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] does not

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/29/2005

, Page 7

b6  
b7c

like working with animals, and [REDACTED] never received training on the use of respirators, which was required for all individuals participating in the challenges. [REDACTED] also noted that [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone at USAMRIID ever "piggy-backing" in or out of hot areas. [REDACTED] explained this was a practice that was absolutely not allowed. [REDACTED] explained that all of the safety and security procedures in place were designed first and foremost to protect the individuals who work at USAMRIID, and [REDACTED] and the people [REDACTED] worked with would never violate any of those procedures. [REDACTED] noted that when you work with such dangerous organisms, and you know what they can do, the last thing you want is to expose yourself or someone else to those organisms. [REDACTED] also noted that visiting scientists were not allowed in the hot suites, and [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone ever taking a visiting scientist into a hot suite.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone ever trying to covertly remove select agents from a hot suite, and [REDACTED] believes it would be very difficult to succeed if you tried. [REDACTED] explained that there are only four paths out of a suite. The first would be a small pass box that sterilizes outgoing items using UV radiation. The box is locked on both sides, and the side where you would retrieve the sterilized item is in the outer hallway, right next to the guard station. It would be very difficult to get anything out of the lab unobserved. [REDACTED] also noted that usually you are using it to remove paperwork from the lab, and you slide the sheets into the pass box one at a time, so that the piece of paper gets sterilized on both sides. [REDACTED] also noted that there is an autoclave in the hot suites. However, the autoclave is designed so that once you open the door on the "hot" side, you can't open the door on the clean side until you have shut the door on the "hot" side, and actually run the machine through one cycle. An organism could not survive the autoclave process. [REDACTED] also noted there is a set of crash doors in the hot suite, for use in an emergency, such as a fire. However, if those doors were opened, alarms would go off and it would be electronically registered that the doors were opened. The last path out of the hot suite would be with an individual, who leaves the suite and goes into the shower. However, the only way you would be able to get something out unobserved via this path would be by putting the item into a body cavity, and [REDACTED] noted [REDACTED] believes there is no way a person could do that without being exposed to the organism/substance. However, if someone actually tried that prior to the terrorist attacks of 09/11/2001, they might have successfully removed the item from the building, because at that time the guards did not search employee bags when they left the building.



279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/29/2005, Page 8

b6  
b7c

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone making any statement indicating they might make a select agent for use in some improper fashion. [REDACTED] is unaware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitudes toward any political organization, the media, or others, with one exception. [REDACTED] noted that a USAMRIID employee named [REDACTED] who likely had access to all of the hot suites, was a very disgruntled employee. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also noted that even though [REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED] does not think [REDACTED] would have been involved with mailing the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] views [REDACTED] as the type of person who would do something like let the air out of your tires to get back at you for something. [REDACTED] described all of the employees at USAMRIID as a good group of people, dedicated to their work and the advancement of science. There was always a great deal of comradery, and there is nobody [REDACTED] knows that [REDACTED] would suspect of being involved with mailing the anthrax letters.

[REDACTED] does not feel that any of the people [REDACTED] worked with at USAMRIID were lax in handling dangerous items, nor does [REDACTED] feel that anyone was inappropriately interested in agents that could be turned into harmful agents. [REDACTED] noted that some people had laboratories that were somewhat messy, but these individuals were not lax in handling items or materials. [REDACTED] is also unaware of anyone being rumored to have an interest in any biological or chemical agent, or the means to produce them, without having a specific need or responsibility to do so. [REDACTED] has no idea how to prepare dried bacillus anthracis and send it through the mail. [REDACTED] noted that making spores is very difficult, and is an art. [REDACTED] never learned how to make spores. [REDACTED] never heard of anyone expressing an interest in being able to get around forensic techniques. [REDACTED] does not have any connection, either personal or professional, to Trenton, New Jersey, Princeton, New Jersey, or any other area of New Jersey. [REDACTED] is unaware of any friends or associates who have connections with these areas. [REDACTED] did not travel to New Jersey during September or October

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/29/2005, Page 9

b6  
b7C

of 2001, and to [REDACTED] knowledge, neither did any of [REDACTED] friends or associates.

[REDACTED] never used plastic storage boxes for storage of [REDACTED] materials while employed at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] is unaware of any work being conducted on bacillus anthracis, or its simulants, that was unofficial or unrecorded. All of [REDACTED] work, while at USAMRIID, was recorded in notebooks. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] filled [REDACTED] notebooks. All of the notebooks are still at USAMRIID, as the policy requires that the official notebooks remain there. However, you are allowed to make copies. [REDACTED] has never purchased a pre-stamped envelope, of any type, at any time during [REDACTED] life. [REDACTED] did not handle any of the anthrax laced letters, and does not know who is responsible for making and sending the letters. [REDACTED] has never conducted any analytical work on the evidence in this case.

[REDACTED] did not know who [REDACTED] does not recall ever seeing [REDACTED] at USAMRIID, and believes that they never worked there at the same time. [REDACTED] believes [REDACTED] was there sometime between [REDACTED] has never physically seen [REDACTED] only one person at USAMRIID made any comments to [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] who worked with [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED] at some point. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] didn't want to say anything more than that about [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] had already been interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never hosted any visiting scientists at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] does not recall anyone ever asking [REDACTED] any unusual, odd, or inappropriate questions. [REDACTED] was not a member of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] has received the anthrax vaccine, in addition to every other vaccine available, which is standard for all USAMRIID employees.

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 06/29/2005, Page 10

\_\_\_\_\_ was asked if \_\_\_\_\_ could think of anyone at USAMRIID who would have claimed \_\_\_\_\_ had access to bacillus anthracis. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that \_\_\_\_\_ may have said \_\_\_\_\_ had access, due to \_\_\_\_\_ work, and the possibility that \_\_\_\_\_ may have done \_\_\_\_\_ was asked if \_\_\_\_\_ knew \_\_\_\_\_ and if \_\_\_\_\_ would have any reason to claim \_\_\_\_\_ had access to bacillus anthracis. \_\_\_\_\_ advised that \_\_\_\_\_ was an \_\_\_\_\_ stationed at USAMRIID. \_\_\_\_\_ had \_\_\_\_\_ lab, but \_\_\_\_\_ could not recall what \_\_\_\_\_ was working on. \_\_\_\_\_ believes \_\_\_\_\_ met \_\_\_\_\_ on one or two occasions.

b6  
b7C

\_\_\_\_\_ was shown the floor plans for building 1412 at USAMRIID (4 pages), and the floor plan for building 1425 at USAMRIID (4 pages). Using a yellow highlighter, \_\_\_\_\_ indicated the areas in these buildings where \_\_\_\_\_ worked and had regular access. (Referenced floor plans were placed in a 1A envelope.)

\_\_\_\_\_ was shown four pictures of flasks which contained writing on them, and was asked if \_\_\_\_\_ ever observed those particular flasks, or flasks like them. \_\_\_\_\_ noted that either the first or second time \_\_\_\_\_ was in hot suite B3 with \_\_\_\_\_ which is the suite in which Bruce Ivins worked, Ivins showed them a flask like the one in the pictures, and asked \_\_\_\_\_ what \_\_\_\_\_ thought was in the flask. \_\_\_\_\_ told Ivins the contents looked like skim milk, and Ivins told \_\_\_\_\_ it was actually "spores". The flask did not contain any writing. At the time, \_\_\_\_\_ wasn't sure if Ivins was serious or not, and thought he may have just been playing a game with \_\_\_\_\_ because it was \_\_\_\_\_ first introduction to the hot suites. (The pictures shown to \_\_\_\_\_ were placed in a 1A envelope.)

b6  
b7C

At the conclusion of the interview, \_\_\_\_\_ was asked if \_\_\_\_\_ would be willing to take a polygraph examination. \_\_\_\_\_ stated that at this time, \_\_\_\_\_ would not be willing to take a polygraph examination. Many of \_\_\_\_\_ from USAMRIID, including \_\_\_\_\_ have been polygraphed, and they did not like the experience, and felt they were being accused of something they had no involvement with. \_\_\_\_\_ was told it was not a good experience, and \_\_\_\_\_ told \_\_\_\_\_ the examiner \_\_\_\_\_ advised that if \_\_\_\_\_ had worked with bacillus anthracis, \_\_\_\_\_ would understand why \_\_\_\_\_ would be asked to take a polygraph, and noted \_\_\_\_\_ would probably take it. But given the fact that \_\_\_\_\_ did not work with bacillus anthracis, and the fact that records can show exactly when \_\_\_\_\_ accessed the

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/29/2005, Page 11

b6  
b7C

hot suites, [REDACTED] does not feel there is a reason to take one. [REDACTED] further elaborated that as a scientist involved in [REDACTED] wants to advance science, and make things better for people. [REDACTED] would never do anything that would cause harm, and [REDACTED] colleagues feel the same way. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] and other colleagues from USAMRIID, feel as if law enforcement really doesn't know who sent the letters, and are under so much pressure to solve the case that they are just focusing on the people at USAMRIID because they had obvious access. [REDACTED] stated that the strain in question has legitimately been given to numerous other research facilities over the years, for legitimate scientific research. [REDACTED] hopes that the investigation also tracks and investigates these individuals/institutions to ensure the bacillus anthracis was not obtained from one of them. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] wants to be helpful, and isn't trying to be negative, but [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] colleagues are frustrated and tired of being looked at with suspicion, because they are good people.

[REDACTED] provided a copy of [REDACTED] resume, which is attached (5 pages).

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/12/2006

[redacted] [Social Security Account Number (SSAN): [redacted] was interviewed, as prearranged, on the morning of May 12, 2006, at [redacted] place of employment [redacted]

[redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Postal Inspector and Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 is a Non-Disclosure Agreement Form which [redacted] reviewed and voluntarily signed.)

[redacted] advised that from [redacted] was a [redacted] in the [redacted] Division at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. After [redacted] was the [redacted] at USAMRIID. Throughout [redacted] tenure as [redacted] and even as the [redacted] of the [redacted] in the [redacted] suite in USAMRIID building [redacted]

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 are the below mentioned USAMRIID floor plans [redacted] was provided for review.)

[redacted] advised [redacted] could not specifically locate the room in the B4 suite of USAMRIID building 1425 in which the fermenter was located; however, [redacted] opined it was Room [redacted] on the provided USAMRIID floor plans. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

These growth medias were further identified as "RM" and "RMM." Incidentally, RMM is similar to BRUCE IVINS's "CA"

Investigation on 05/12/2006 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 4757Date dictated N/A

Postal Inspector [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-302

b6  
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/12/2006, Page 2

growth media. RM, RMM, and CA consisted of organic salts and sugars, neither RM, RMM, nor CA contained unique elements such as the semi-metal Silicon (Si). \_\_\_\_\_ opined should a growth media contain a unique element, then bacterium which propagate and/or sporulate in the media would likely contain the unique element. However, \_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ was not a sporulation expert.

\_\_\_\_\_ advised to \_\_\_\_\_ knowledge the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* was never \_\_\_\_\_ recalled \_\_\_\_\_ the Sterne strain of *Bacillus anthracis* for use in toxin studies. \_\_\_\_\_ further advised scientists at USAMRIID sought to understand the role(s) of Edema Factor (EF), Lethal Factor (LF), and Protective Antigen (PA) in anthrax pathogenesis, as well as discovery of their immunogenic properties. As such, there was a need to produce quantities of these purified EF, LF, and PA proteins via fermentation. \_\_\_\_\_ explained the Sterne strain of *Bacillus anthracis* was used to accomplish this goal.

\_\_\_\_\_ initially inoculated a 100 or 500 milliliter (ml) flask with the Sterne strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, after a period of time and with shaking, the bacteria would propagate. \_\_\_\_\_ could not recall if \_\_\_\_\_ transferred the Sterne strain of *Bacillus anthracis* from this flask to the fermenter via a simple pour, or if \_\_\_\_\_ utilized a more aseptic procedure of injecting the flask contents, via a sterile syringe, into the side port of the fermenter. \_\_\_\_\_ was instrumental in determining the appropriate growth conditions. The pH of the media was crucial for *Bacillus anthracis* growth and was at a physiological relevant level. \_\_\_\_\_ further advised the pH was neither strongly acidic nor caustic.

The initial 100 or 500 ml flask of the Sterne strain of *Bacillus anthracis* was fermented for an unknown period of time in the toxin studies. \_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ simply could not recall for how long the fermenter ran in the toxin studies. \_\_\_\_\_ advised it would be possible to inoculate the 50 L fermenter with a smaller volume; however, it would take much longer to obtain a reasonable yield. \_\_\_\_\_ opined *Bacillus anthracis* generally doubled its population every two (2) hours in the 50 L fermenter.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ fermenter would run overnight, and in the morning the process was stopped as sufficient bacteria were present.

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/12/2006, Page 3

[REDACTED] opined if some one adapted [REDACTED] toxin fermentation protocol in order to produce *Bacillus anthracis* spores, it would probably take 2-3 days in order to produce spores; however, the spore yield would be low.

As it related to the toxin studies at USAMRIID, after fermentation a small quantity of its contents was viewed microscopically. [REDACTED] advised almost all of the Sterne strain of *Bacillus anthracis* remained as vegetative cells. [REDACTED] opined [REDACTED] could not recall any details of their morphology. The fermenter contents were subsequently pumped to a centrifuge. The supernatant was collected for further protein isolation and purification. The pellet of vegetative cells of the Sterne strain of *Bacillus anthracis* were discarded. [REDACTED] could not recall if [REDACTED] fermented the [REDACTED] strain of *Bacillus anthracis*; however, [REDACTED] reiterated [REDACTED] never fermented the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*.

[REDACTED] advised fermentation of virulent bacterium, such as the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, was a very dangerous process as the fermenter itself was an excellent aerosolizer. [REDACTED] advised even although the air used during the fermentation process was continually channeled from the fermenter to an incinerator, thereby destroying any aerosolized bacterium, to produce virulent spores, such as the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*, one would likely contaminate the entire suite and place his fellow co-workers at risk. Using the fermenter at USAMRIID with the Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis* was specifically forbidden.

[REDACTED] opined the elemental signature of biological agents might provide clues to methods of production. For example, *Bacillus anthracis* spores that were grown on agar plates ought to contain trace elements unique to the agar. For small scale *Bacillus anthracis* spore preparations, the agar plate method is the preferred method for spore production. [REDACTED] perfected this procedure. [REDACTED] noted the agar needed a quantity of Magnesium (Mg) to be present to assist in *Bacillus anthracis* sporulation.

[REDACTED] advised for large scale *Bacillus anthracis* spore production, such as that found in the former Russian offensive biological weapons program, a fermenter was used. The fermenter method would thus not show trace elements unique to the agar. If a Silicon anti-foam was utilized, then the Silicon may be a trace

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 05/12/2006, Page 4 b6  
b7C

element unique to *Bacillus anthracis* spores produced via the fermentation process that used a Silicon anti-foam agent. [redacted] advised [redacted]

[redacted]

As an aside, the interior of the 50 L fermenter at USAMRIID was stainless steel, which was initially unique. A prevailing theory, at the time of its initial purchase, was that *Bacillus anthracis* propagated best in glass lined vessels. [redacted] advised subsequent research found that *Bacillus anthracis* propagated equally well in stainless steel vessels.

[redacted] observed BRUCE IVINS in the B4 hot suite. IVINS had a "different personality"; however, was professionally competent. [redacted] advised [redacted] never heard IVINS make any remark, or comment, one would consider disloyal to the U.S., or the U.S. government. [redacted] could not think of any past or current USAMRIID employee who would have reason to make derogatory statements pertaining to [redacted] or [redacted]. [redacted] did not have any personal or professional conflicts with anyone at USAMRIID. On occasion, [redacted] had professional disagreements with [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised [redacted] was also at USAMRIID in the hot suite while [redacted] was there. [redacted] advised [redacted] was very competent. [redacted] never heard [redacted] express any comment or opinion [redacted] would consider inappropriate, or one that would give [redacted] pause for concern.



279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 05/12/2006 , Page 5

b6  
b7C[REDACTED] also was at USAMRIID with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED][REDACTED] has been in recent contact with [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(WFO NOTE: maintained in the FD-340 are printouts of a *Bacillus anthracis* collection labeled [REDACTED] which were provided to [REDACTED] for review.)

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] did not recognize the contents in the provided printouts. [REDACTED] further advised [REDACTED] was not familiar with [REDACTED] handwriting, and as such was unable to identify the handwriting in the provided printouts. [REDACTED] was uncertain as to whether the isolates in the provided printouts were inventoried by [REDACTED] pursuant to [REDACTED] request. [REDACTED] advised it was not uncommon for lyophilized bacterium to arrive at USAMRIID, as this often was the most stable form to ship vegetative bacterium cells. [REDACTED] could not recall any instance when spore preparations were lyophilized at USAMRIID, nor if USAMRIID ever received any lyophilized spores.

[REDACTED] was not knowledgeable of the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* at USAMRIID, other than [REDACTED] believed it was received at USAMRIID in the early 1980s from a U.S. Department of Agriculture laboratory under [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(WFO NOTE: [REDACTED] with the concurrence of the interviewing Postal Inspector and SA, took a short recess for lunch and to look for additional paperwork. The interview reconvened after a 1 hour break.)

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had located what [REDACTED] believed was the results of [REDACTED] *Bacillus anthracis* inventory at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] provided the interviewing Postal Inspector and SA a [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/12/2006, Page 6

b6  
b7c

[REDACTED] noted the document was not dated, so [REDACTED] was not certain as to the exact date this collection was maintained at USAMRIID.

(WFO NOTE: attached hereto and considered part of this document are photocopies of the above mentioned 7 page document, the original documents are maintained in the FD-340.)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] first met [REDACTED] at an anthrax meeting. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] never indicated to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] possessed the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had expressed an interest to [REDACTED] to attend the 2001 anthrax conference in Annapolis, Maryland. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] spoke with [REDACTED] prior to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know what strains of *Bacillus anthracis* [REDACTED] worked with at [REDACTED] nor whether or not [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] last spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] as being gregarious, and [REDACTED] often referred despairingly to [REDACTED] as being a [REDACTED] current research focus pertains to anthrax vaccine development, as well as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 05/12/2006, Page 7

b6  
b7C

not knowledgeable of what strain(s) of *Bacillus anthracis* \_\_\_\_\_  
used in \_\_\_\_\_ research. \_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ was not certain if \_\_\_\_\_  
was attending the June 2006 NIAID conference to be held in \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ opined  
\_\_\_\_\_ had a sense of loyalty to \_\_\_\_\_ and as  
such, did not reveal what \_\_\_\_\_ was asking for. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ was a former researcher at USAMRIID and  
\_\_\_\_\_ who is currently involved in anthrax related research \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ have been long  
time collaborators. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ reiterated it  
was \_\_\_\_\_ understanding that \_\_\_\_\_ worked for \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ advised \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ was not knowledgeable of any indicators of an \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ nor what strains of *Bacillus anthracis* were maintained by \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 05/12/2006, Page 8

b6  
b7C

[REDACTED] was a former [REDACTED] scientist at  
USAMRIID who worked for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] was not  
knowledgeable of any virulent bacterium possessed by, or otherwise  
maintained at, the [REDACTED]

[WFO NOTE: the interviewing SA provided [REDACTED] with an  
abbreviated [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] briefing, to which [REDACTED] was receptive.]

[REDACTED] was agreeable to re-contact by the interviewing  
Postal Inspector and SA following [REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 26

Page 116 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 117 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 118 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 119 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 120 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 121 ~ b6, b7C, b7D

Page 144 ~ b6, b7C

Page 145 ~ b6, b7C

Page 146 ~ b6, b7C

Page 147 ~ b6, b7C

Page 148 ~ b6, b7C

Page 149 ~ b6, b7C

Page 162 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 163 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 185 ~ b6, b7C

Page 186 ~ b6, b7C

Page 187 ~ b6, b7C

Page 188 ~ b6, b7C

Page 189 ~ b6, b7C

Page 206 ~ b6, b7C

Page 207 ~ b6, b7C

Page 208 ~ b6, b7C

Page 209 ~ b6, b7C

Page 210 ~ b6, b7C

Page 211 ~ b6, b7C

Page 212 ~ b6, b7C